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Abstract
We define the functionality of delegated pseudo-secret random qubit generator (PSRQG),
where a classical client can instruct the preparation of a sequence of random qubits at some
distant party. Their classical description is (computationally) unknown to any other party
(including the distant party preparing them) but known to the client. We emphasize the unique
feature that no quantum communication is required to implement PSRQG. This enables classical
clients to perform a class of quantum communication protocols with only a public classical
channel with a quantum server. A key such example is the delegated universal blind quantum
computing. Using our functionality one could achieve a purely classical-client computational
secure verifiable delegated universal quantum computing (also referred to as verifiable blind
quantum computation). We give a concrete protocol (QFactory) implementing PSRQG, using
the Learning-With-Errors problem to construct a trapdoor one-way function with certain desired
properties (quantum-safe, two-regular, collision-resistant). We then prove the security in the
Quantum-Honest-But-Curious setting and briefly discuss the extension to the malicious case.
1 Introduction and Related Works
The recent interest in quantum technologies has brought forward a vision of quantum internet
[ELG+17] that could implement a collection of known protocols for enhanced security or commu-
nication complexity (see a recent review in [BS16]). On the other hand the rapid development
of quantum hardware has increased the computational capacity of quantum servers that could be
linked in such a communicating network. This raised the necessity/importance of privacy preserv-
ing functionalities such as the research developed around quantum computing on encrypted data
(see a recent review in [Fit17]).
However, there exist some challenges in adapting widely the above vision: A reliable long-
distance quantum communication network connecting all the interested parties might be very
costly. Moreover, currently, some of the most promising quantum computation devices (e.g. super-
conducting such as the devices developed by IBM, Google, etc) do not yet offer the possibility of
“networked” architecture, i.e. cannot receive and send quantum states.
∗Original article: “Delegated Pseudo-Secret Random Qubit Generator”, February 27, 2018
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For this reason, there has been extensive research focusing on the practicality aspect of quan-
tum delegated computation protocols (and related functionalities). One direction is to reduce
the required communications by exploiting classical fully-homomorphic-encryption schemes [BJ15,
DSS16, ADSS17], or by defining their direct quantum analogues [Lia15, OTF15, TKO+16, LC17].
Different encodings, on the client side, could also reduce the communication [MPDF13, GMMR13].
However, in all these approaches the client still requires some quantum capabilities. While no-go
results indicate restrictions on which of the above properties are jointly achievable for classical
clients [AGKP14, YPDF14, ACGK17, NS17], completing this picture remains an open problem.
Another direction is to consider fully-classical client protocols, compatible with the no-go results,
that can therefore achieve more restricted levels of security. The first such procedure achieving
statistical security (but not for universal computations) was proposed in [MDMF17]. Focusing on
post-quantum computational security a universal blind delegated protocol was proposed in [Mah17]
and a verifiable one in [Mah18].
Our own independent work presented here, is also based on post-quantum computational secu-
rity, appeared (in preprint [CCKW18]) in between the above mentioned two works, taking a different
approach, more natural to measurement-based quantum computing protocols. The approach we
take is modular. We replace the need for (a particular) quantum communication channel with a
computationally (but post-quantum) secure generation of secret and random qubits. This can be
used by classical clients to achieve blind quantum computing and a number of other applications.
1.1 Our Contributions
1. We define a classical client/quantum server delegated ideal functionality of pseudo-secret
random qubit generator (PSRQG), in Section 3. PSRQG can replace the need for quantum
channel between parties in certain quantum communication protocols with trade-off that the
protocols become computationally secure (against quantum adversaries).
2. We give a basic protocol (QFactory) that achieves this functionality, given a trapdoor one-way
function that is quantum-safe, two-regular and collision resistant resistant in Section 4 and
prove its correctness.
3. We prove the security of the QFactory against Quantum-Honest-But-Curious server or against
any malicious third party by proving that the classical description of the generated qubits is
a hard-core function (following a reduction similar that of the Goldreich-Levin Theorem) in
Section 5.
4. While our previous results do not depend on the specific function used, the existence of
such specific functions (with all desired properties) makes the PSRQG a practical primitive
that can be employed as described in this paper. In Section 6, we first give methods for
obtaining two-regular trapdoor one-way functions with extra properties (collision resistant
or second preimage resistant) assuming the existence of simpler trapdoor one-way functions
(permutation trapdoor or homomorphic trapdoor functions). We use reductions to prove
that the resulting functions maintain all the properties required. Furthermore, we give in
Subsection 6.3 an explicit family of functions that respect all the required properties based
on the security of the Learning-With-Errors problem as well as a possible instantiation of
the parameters. Thus, this function is also quantum-safe, and thus directly applicable for
our setting. Note, that other functions may also be used, such as the one in [BCM+18] or
functions based on the Niederreither cryptosystem and the construction in [FGK+10].
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1.2 Applications
The PSRQG functionality, viewed as a resource, has a wide range of applications. Here we give a
general overview of the applications, while for details on how to use the exact output of the PSRQG
obtained in this paper in specific protocols we refer the reader to Appendix A. PSRQG enables
fully-classical parties to participate in many quantum protocols using only public classical channels
and a single (potentially malicious) quantum server.
The first type of applications concerns a large class of delegated quantum computation
protocols, including blind quantum computation and verifiable blind quantum computation. These
protocols are of great importance, enabling information-theoretically secure (and verifiable) access
to a quantum cloud. However, the requirement for quantum communication limits their domain
of applicability. This limitation is removed by replacing the off-line preparation stage with our
QFactory protocol. Concretely, we can use QFactory to implement the blind quantum computation
protocol of [BFK09], as well as the verifiable blind quantum computation protocols (e.g. those in
[FK12, Bro15, FKD17]), in order to achieve classical-client secure and verifiable access to a quantum
cloud.
In all these cases, the cost of using PSRQG is that the security becomes post-quantum compu-
tational (from information-theoretic). However, the possibility of information-theoretically secure
classical client blind quantum computation seems highly unlikely due to strong complexity-theoretic
arguments given in [ACGK17] and therefore this is the best we could hope for.
The second type of applications involves the family of protocols for which their quan-
tum communication consists of random single qubits as the ones provided by QFactory, such as:
quantum-key-distribution [BB84], quantum money [BOV+18], quantum coin-flipping [PCDK11],
quantum signatures [WDKA15], two-party quantum computation [KW17, KMW17], multiparty
quantum computation [KP17], etc.
Finally, we note that in order to use PSRQG as a subroutine in a larger protocol, we need
to address the issue of composition and formulate the functionality in the universal composability
framework [Unr10]. This could be done as in [DK16] (where quantum communication was required,
using a quantum version of SRQG), but the full details are outside of the scope of this paper.
1.3 Overview of the Protocol and Proof
The general idea is that a classical client gives instructions to a quantum server to perform certain
actions (quantum computation). Those actions lead to the server having as output a single qubit,
which is randomly chosen from within a set of possible states of the form |0〉 + eirpi/4 |1〉, where
r ∈ {0, · · · , 7}. The randomness of the output qubit is due to the (fundamental) randomness of
quantum measurements that are part of the instructions that the client gives. Moreover, the server
cannot guess the value of r any better than if he had just received that state directly from the
client (up to negligible probability). This is possible because the instructed quantum computation
is generically a computation that is hard to (i) classically simulate and (ii) to reproduce quantumly
because it is unlikely (exponentially in the number of measurements) that by running the same
instructions the server obtains the exact same measurement outcomes twice. On the other hand,
we wish the client to know the classical description and thus the value of r. To achieve this task,
the instructions/quantum computation the client uses are based on a family of trapdoor one-way
functions with certain extra properties1. Such functions are hard to invert (e.g. for the server)
unless someone (the client in our case) has some extra “trapdoor” information tk. This extra in-
1The functions should also be two-regular (each image has exactly two preimages), quantum safe (secure against
quantum attackers) and collision resistant (hard to find two inputs with the same image).
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formation makes the quantum computation easy to classically reproduce for the client, which can
recover the value r, while it is still hard to classically reproduce for the server. Sending random
qubits of the above type, is exactly what is required from the client in most of the protocols and
applications given earlier, while with simple modifications our protocol could achieve other similar
sets of states.
Our QFactory protocol can heuristically be described in the next steps:
Preparation. The client randomly selects a function fk, from a family of trapdoor one-way,
quantum-safe, two-regular and collision resistant functions. The choice of fk is public (server
knows), but the trapdoor information tk needed to invert the function is known only to the client.
Stage 1: Preimages Superposition. The client instructs the server (i) to apply Hadamard(s)
on the control register, (ii) to apply Ufk on the target register i.e. to obtain
∑
x |x〉 ⊗ |fk(x)〉 and
(iii) to measure the target register in the computational basis, in order to obtain a value y. This
collapses his state to the state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗ |y〉, where x, x′ are the unique two preimages of y.
Remarks. First we note that each image y appears with same probability (therefore, obtaining
twice the same y happens with negligible probability). We now consider the first register |x〉+|x′〉 =
|x1 · · ·xn〉+|x′1 · · ·x′n〉, where the subscripts denote the different bits of the corresponding preimages
x and x′. We rewrite this:(⊗i∈G¯ |xi〉 )⊗ (∏
j∈G
Xxj
)( |0 · · · 0〉G + |1 · · · 1〉G )
where G¯ is the set of bits positions where x, x′ are identical, G is the set of bits positions where
the preimages differ, while we have suitably changed the order of writing the qubits. It is now
evident that the state at the end of Stage 1 is a tensor product of isolated |0〉 and |1〉 states, and
a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state with random X’s applied. The crucial observation is
that the connectivity (which qubit belongs to the GHZ and which doesn’t) depends on the XOR
of the two preimages x ⊕ x′ and is computationally impossible to determine, with non-negligible
advantage, without the trapdoor information tk.
Stage 2: Squeezing. The client instructs the server to measure each qubit i (except the output)
in a random basis {|0〉 ± eiαipi/4 |1〉} and return back the measurement outcome bi. The output
qubit is of the form |+θ〉 = |0〉+ eiθ |1〉, where (see [CCKW18]):
θ =
pi
4
(−1)xn
n−1∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi) mod 8 (1)
Intuitively, measuring qubits that are not connected has no effect to the output, while measuring
qubits within the GHZ part, rotates the phase of the output qubit (by a (−(1)xiαi+4bi)pi/4 angle).
Security. The protocol is secure, if we can prove that the server (or other third parties) cannot
guess (obtain noticeable advantage in guessing) the classical description of the state, i.e. the value
of θ. We consider a quantum-honest-but-curious server (see formal definition below) which means
that he essentially follows the protocol and the security reduces in proving that the server cannot
use his classical information to obtain any advantage in guessing the classical description of the
(honest) quantum output.
The server does not know the two preimages x, x′ and needs to guess θ from the value of the
image y. A similar (simpler) result that we use is the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89a], that
(informally) states that the inner product of the preimage of a one-way function with a random
vector, taken modulo 2, is indistinguishable from a random bit. Our case is similar since Eq. (1) has
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the form of an inner product of the XOR of two preimages with a random vector taken modulo 8.
We prove that if a computationally bounded server could obtain non-trivial advantage in guessing
θ, then he could also break the property of “second preimage resistance” which we requested for
our function fk.
The function. Our protocol relies on using functions that have a number of properties (one-
way, trapdoor, two-regular, collision resistant (see Remark 3.1)), quantum safe). Any function
satisfying those conditions is suitable for our protocol. While in first thought some of these appear
hard to satisfy jointly (e.g. two-regularity and collision resistance), we give two constructions that
achieve those properties from simpler functions: one from injective, homomorphic trapdoor one-
way function and one from bijective trapdoor one-way function. Both constructions define a new
function that has domain extended by one bit, and the value of that bit “decides” whether one uses
the initial basic function or not.
We then use a (slight) modification of the first construction and the trapdoor one-way function
based on the Learning-with-Errors of [MP12] with suitable choice of parameters, and obtain a
function that has all the desired properties. In a nutshell, the idea is to use the construction
of [MP12], to create an injective function g(s, e) hard to invert without the secret trapdoor, and
then to sample from a Gaussian distribution a small error term e0 ∈ Zmq as well as a (uniform)
random s0 ∈ Znq . According to [MP12], it should be impossible to recover efficiently s0 and e0
from b0 := g(s0, e0). Then, to create the function f(s, e, c), we define f(s, e, 0) = g(s, e) and
f(s, e, 1) = g(s, e)+b0, and we require e to have infinity norm smaller than a parameter µ. Because
the function is “nearly homomorphic”, it appears that f(s, e, 1) = f(s+s0, e+e0, 0), so this function
has intuitively two preimages. However, e+e0 may not be small enough to stay in the input domain,
so it may be possible to have only one preimage for some y. What we show is that if we sample
e0 “small enough” (at least as small as O(µ/m)), then the probability to have two preimages is
at least constant. Moreover, we prove that this modification does not break the security of g, and
leads to a function f that is both one-way and collision resistant under the LWE assumption,
which reduces to SIVPγ , with γ = poly(n).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical Definitions
We are considering protocols secure against quantum adversaries, so we assume that all the prop-
erties of our functions hold for a general Quantum Polynomial Time (QPT) adversary, rather than
the usual Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) one. We will denote D the domain of the functions,
while D(n) is the subset of strings of length n.
Definition 2.1 (Quantum-Safe (informal)). A protocol/function is quantum-safe (also known as
post-quantum secure), if all its properties remain valid when the adversaries are QPT (instead of
PPT).
The following definitions are for PPT adversaries, however in this paper we will generally use
quantum-safe versions of those definitions and thus security is guaranteed against QPT adversaries.
Definition 2.2 (One-way). A family of functions {fk : D → R}k∈K is one-way if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k, outcome of
the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
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• Any PPT algorithm A can invert fk with at most negligible probability over the choice of k:
Pr
k←Gen(1n)
x←D
rc←{0,1}∗
[f(A(k, fk(x)) = f(x)] ≤ negl(n)
where rc represents the randomness used by A
Definition 2.3 (Second preimage resistant). A family of functions {fk : D → R}k∈K is second
preimage resistant if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k, outcome of
the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
• For any PPT algorithm A, given an input x, it can find a different input x′ such that fk(x) =
fk(x
′) with at most negligible probability over the choice of k:
Pr
k←Gen(1n)
x←D
rc←{0,1}∗
[A(k, x) = x′such that x 6= x′ and fk(x) = fk(x′)] ≤ negl(n)
where rc is the randomness of A;
Definition 2.4 (Collision resistant). A family of functions {fk : D → R}k∈K is collision resis-
tant if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k, outcome of
the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
• Any PPT algorithm A can find two inputs x 6= x′ such that fk(x) = fk(x′) with at most
negligible probability over the choice of k:
Pr
k←Gen(1n)
rc←{0,1}∗
[A(k) = (x, x′)such that x 6= x′ and fk(x) = fk(x′)] ≤ negl(n)
where rc is the randomness of A (rc will be omitted from now).
Theorem 2.1. [KL14] Any function that is collision resistant is also second preimage resistant.
Definition 2.5 (k-regular). A deterministic function f : D → R is k-regular if ∀y ∈ Im(f), we
have |f−1(y)| = k.
Definition 2.6 (Trapdoor Function). A family of functions {fk : D → R} is a trapdoor function
if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm Gen which on input 1n outputs (k, tk), where k represents the
index of the function;
• {fk : D → R}k∈K is a family of one-way functions;
• There exists a PPT algorithm Inv, which on input tk (which is called the trapdoor information)
output by Gen(1n) and y = fk(x) can invert y (by returning all preimages of y
2) with non-
negligible probability over the choice of (k, tk) and uniform choice of x.
Definition 2.7 (Hard-core Predicate). A function hc : D → {0, 1} is a hard-core predicate for
a function f if:
2While in the standard definition of trapdoor functions it suffices for the inversion algorithm Inv to return one
of the preimages of any output of the function, in our case we require a two-regular tradpdoor function where the
inversion procedure returns both preimages for any function output.
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• There exists a QPT algorithm that for any input x can compute hc(x);
• Any PPT algorithm A when given f(x), can compute hc(x) with negligible better than 1/2
probability:
Pr
x←D(n)
rc←{0,1}∗
[A(f(x), 1n) = hc(x)] ≤ 12 +negl(n), where rc represents the randomness used by A;
Definition 2.8 (Hard-core Function). A function h : D → E is a hard-core function for a
function f if:
• There exists a QPT algorithm that can compute h(x) for any input x
• For any PPT algorithm A when given f(x), A can distinguish between h(x) and a uniformly
distributed element in E with at most negligible probability:∣∣ Pr
x←D(n)
[A(f(x), h(x)) = 1]− Pr
x←D(n)
r←E(|h(x)|)
[A(f(x), r) = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
The intuition behind this definition is that as far as a QPT adversary is concerned, the hard-core
function appears indistinguishable from a randomly chosen element of the same length.
Theorem 2.2 (Goldreich-Levin [GL89b]). From any one-way function f : D → R, we can construct
another one-way function g : D ×D → R ×D and a hard-core predicate for g. If f is a one-way
function, then:
• g(x, r) = (f(x), r) is a one-way function, where |x| = |r|.
• hc(x, r) = 〈x, r〉 mod 2 is a hard-core predicate for g
Informally, the Goldreich-Levin theorem is proving that when f is a one-way function, then
f(x) is hiding the xor of a random subset of bits of x from any PPT adversary3.
Theorem 2.3 (Vazirani-Vazirani XOR-Condition Theorem [VV85]). Function h is hard-core func-
tion for f if and only if the xor of any non-empty subset of h’s bits is a hard-core predicate for
f .
The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) can be described in the following way:
Definition 2.9 (LWE problem (informal)). Given s, an n dimensional vector with elements in
Zq, the task is to distinguish between a set of polynomially many noisy random linear combinations
of the elements of s and a set of polynomially many random numbers from Zq.
Regev [Reg05] and Peikert [Pei09] have given quantum and classical reductions from the average
case of LWE to problems such as approximating the length of the shortest vector or the shortest
independent vectors problem in the worst case, problems which are conjectured to be hard even for
quantum computers.
Theorem 2.4 (Reduction LWE, from [Reg05, Therem 1.1]). Let n, q be integers and α ∈ (0, 1) be
such that αq > 2
√
n. If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves LWEq,Ψ¯α, then there exists an
efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest vector problem
GapSVP and the shortest independent vectors problem SIVP to within O˜(n/α) in the worst case.
3 The Goldreich-Levin proof is using a reduction from breaking the hard-core predicate hc(x, r) to breaking the
one-wayness of h. In this paper the functions we consider are one-way against quantum adversaries, and using the
same reduction we conclude that hc(x, r) is a hard-core predicate against QPT adversaries.
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2.2 Quantum definitions
We assume basic familiarity with quantum computing notions. For any function f : A → B that
can be described by a polynomially-sized classical circuit, we define the controlled-unitary Uf , as
acting in the following way:
Uf |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 ∀x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B, (2)
where we name the first register |x〉 control and the second register |y〉 target. Given the classical
description of this function f , we can always define a QPT algorithm that efficiently implements
Uf .
The protocol we want to implement (achieving PSRQG) can be viewed as a special case of a
two-party quantum computation protocol, where one side (Client) has only classical information
and thus the communication consists of classical messages. Furthermore, the client is honest, so we
only need to prove security (and simulators) against adversarial server. Finally, the ideal protocol
(giving same output but mediated by a trusted party; see definition below) that the real protocol
implements, needs to be by itself PSRQG, i.e. obtaining the legitimate outputs should not leak
any extra information (see Sections 3 and 5). In this paper, unless stated otherwise, we use the
convention that all quantum operators considered are described by polynomially-sized quantum
circuits.
We follow the notations and conventions of [DNS10]. We have two parties A,B with registers
A,B and an extra register R with dimR = (dimA + dimB). The input state is denoted ρin ∈
D(A⊗B⊗R), whereD(A) is the set of all possible quantum states in registerA. We also denote with
L(A) the set of linear mappings from A to itself. The ideal output4 is given by ρout = (U⊗IR) ·ρin,
where for simplicity we write U ·ρ instead of UρU †. For two states ρ0, ρ1 we denote the trace norm
distance ∆(ρ0, ρ1) :=
1
2‖ρ0− ρ1‖. If ∆(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  then any process applied on ρ0 behaves as for ρ1
except with probability at most .
Definition 2.10 (taken from [DNS10]). An n-step two party strategy is denoted ΠO = (A,B,O, n):
1. input spaces A0,B0 and memory spaces A1, · · · ,An and B1, · · · ,Bn
2. n-tuple of quantum operations (LA1 , · · · , LAn ) and (LB1 , · · · , LBn ) such that LAi : L(Ai−1) →
L(Ai) and similarly for LBi .
3. n-tuple of global operations (O1, · · · ,On) for that step, Oi : L(Ai ⊗ Bi)→ L(Ai ⊗ Bi)
The global operations (in our case) are communications that transfers some (classical) register
from one party to another. The quantum state in each step of the protocol is given by:
ρ1(ρin) := (O1 ⊗ I)(LA1 ⊗ LB1 ⊗ I)(ρin)
ρi+1(ρin) := (Oi+1 ⊗ I)(LAi+1 ⊗ LBi+1 ⊗ I)(ρi(ρin)) (3)
Definition 2.11 (Ideal Protocol). Given a real protocol, we call the corresponding“ideal protocol”
a protocol that has same input/output distributions with an honest run of the real protocol, but all
intermediate steps are completed by a trusted third party.
The security definitions are based on the corresponding ideal protocol of secure two-party quan-
tum computation (S2PQC) that takes a joint input ρin ∈ A0 ⊗ B0, obtains the state U · ρin and
4In case of unitary protocol U , while it generalises for any quantum operations.
8
returns to each party their corresponding quantum registers. A protocol ΠOU implements the pro-
tocol securely, if no possible adversary in any step of the protocol, can distinguish with a non
negligible probability whether they interact with the real protocol or with a simulator (which has
access to the ideal protocol). When a party is malicious we add the notation “∼”, e.g. A˜.
Definition 2.12 (Simulator). S(A˜) = 〈(S1, · · · ,Sn), q〉 is a simulator for adversary A˜ in ΠOU if it
consists of:
1. operations where Si : L(A0)→ L(A˜i) are described by polynomially-sized quantum circuits,
2. sequence of bits q ∈ {0, 1}n determining if the simulator calls the ideal functionality at step i
(qi = 1 calls the ideal functionality).
Given input ρin the simulated view for step i is defined as:
νi(A˜, ρin) := TrB0 ((Si ⊗ I)(U qi ⊗ I) · ρin) (4)
Definition 2.13 (Privacy with respect to the Ideal Protocol). We say that the protocol is δ-private
(with respect to an ideal protocol) if for all adversaries and for all steps i:
∆(νi(A˜, ρin),TrBi(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin))) ≤ δ (5)
where ρ˜i(A˜, ρin) is the state of the real protocol with corrupted party A˜, at step i.
The honest-but-curious (HBC) adversaries, follow the protocol honestly, keeping records of
all communication and attempt to learn from those more than what they should. Since quantum
states cannot be copied, in [DNS10] they defined an adversary that could be considered the quantum
analogue, called specious adversary.
Definition 2.14 (Specious). An adversary A˜ is -specious if there exists a sequence of operations
(T1, · · · , Tn), where Ti : L(A˜i) → L(Ai) can be described by polynomially-sized quantum circuits,
such that for all i:
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I)(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)), ρi(ρin)
)
≤  (6)
In our protocol, where communications are classical, it is sensible to define a weaker version of
the adversary:
Definition 2.15 (Quantum-Honest-But-Curious (QHBC)). An adversary A˜ is QHBC if it is 0-
specious.
3 Ideal Functionality
In many distributed protocols the required communication consists of sending sequence of single
qubits prepared in random states that are unknown to the receiver (and any other third parties).
What we want to achieve is a way to generate remotely single qubits that are random and (appear
to be) unknown to all parties but the “client” that gives the instructions.
In this work, for clarity and having in mind the applications we wish to implement, we will
focus on a particular choice for the set R of possible states that contains eight different single-qubit
states (see below). One could easily modify our work to restrict to a smaller set (e.g. the four
BB84 states [BB84] that would actually simplify our proofs) or a larger set.
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Definition 3.1. Let |+θ〉 = 1/
√
2
(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉). We define the set of states
R := {|+θ〉} where θ ∈ {0, pi/4, pi/2, · · · , 7pi/4} (7)
By including magic states (
∣∣+pi/4〉), this set of states can be viewed as a “universal” resource,
as applying Clifford operations on those states is sufficient for universal quantum computation.
Furthermore, it is sufficient to implement both Blind Quantum Computation (e.g. [BFK09]) and
Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation (e.g. [FKD17]).
Protocol 3.1 Ideal Functionality: Secret Random Qubit Generator (SRQG) – F(M,p)
Public Information: A distribution on pairs of lists M , intuitively containing the values of the
classical variables used by the client and by the server
Trusted Party:
– With some probability p returns to both parties abort, otherwise:
– Samples (mC ,mS)←M
– Samples r ← {0, 1}3
– Prepares a qubit in state
∣∣+(rpi/4)〉
Outputs:
– Either returns abort to both client and server
– Or returns (mC , r) to the client, and (mS ,
∣∣+(rpi/4)〉) to the server
Remarks: (i) The outcome of this functionality is the client “sending” the qubit |+θ〉 (that he
knows) to the server, thus simulating a quantum channel. (ii) We note that there is an abort
possibility and some auxiliary classical message m, both included to make the functionality general
enough to allow for our construction. Furthermore, the classical description of the qubit r and
the classical message m are totally uncorrelated (as r is chosen randomly for each m). (iii) While
the server can learn something about the classical description (e.g. by measuring the qubit), this
information is limited and is the exact same information that he could obtain if the client had
prepared and send a random qubit. Therefore, the privacy is defined with respect to this ideal
setting.
We are interested only in the honest-but-curious setting for now. The idea is that we will
allow the adversary to have access to the classical registers/variables of the server (we will call
these information a “view”), as well as the classical variables produced by the ideal functionality
(uncorrelated with the quantum output, so secure by definition). The goal of the adversary will
be to distinguish whether he is interacting with a view of the ideal functionality or a view of the
real protocol. More formally, we will denote by PS the view of server S in protocol P, which is
the list of the content of the variables/classical registers assigned by the server S in the protocol
P. Similarly, FS will be the view of the server S in the ideal functionality F , equal to the value of
mS in a run of the idea functionality.
Definition 3.2 (Pseudo-Secret Random Qubit Generator (PSRQG)). We call a protocol P(1n)
to be ε(n)-Pseudo-Secret Random Qubit Generator (ε(n)-PSRQG) if there exists a SRQG F(M,p)
such that for all Quantum Polynomial Time (QPT) adversaries/distinguishers A:
|Pr[A(PS(1n)) = 1]− Pr[A(FS(M,p)) = 1]| ≤ ε(n) (8)
If ε(n) is a negligible function, we will simply denote it PSQRG (omitting ε(n)).
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To achieve the PSRQG functionality we define an ideal protocol, called Ideal QFactory5, medi-
ated by a trusted third party that (under certain assumptions) achieves the PSRQG functionality.
This ideal protocol, can be realised by a concrete protocol without any trusted parties (see later),
and certain choices in the definition of the ideal QFactory (e.g. the function required) are done
with this in mind.
Protocol 3.2 Ideal QFactory Protocol
Public Information: A security parameter n ∈ N∗, a trapdoor one-way function that are
quantum-safe, two-regular and collision resistant (or the weaker second preimage resistance prop-
erty, see Remark 3.1) {fk : D → R}k∈K and a family of functions {gk : D ×D × E → {0, 1}3}k∈K
Trusted Party:
– Runs the algorithm Gen(1n) = (k, tk) of the trapdoor function
– Samples randomly x← D,β ← E
– Using tk, computes the unique other preimage x
′ 6= x such that fk(x) = fk(x′) = y
– If the last bit of x and x′ is the same, abort otherwise
– Computes B˜ := gk(x, x
′, β). Setting θ := B˜ × pi/4, prepares a qubit in the state |+θ〉
Outputs:
– Either returns abort to both parties
– Or returns (k, y, β, |+θ〉) to server S and (tk, y, β, θ) to client C. Note that the θ is optional and
could have been recomputed by the client from tk.
Remark 3.1. It appears that the second preimage resistance property will be enough to prove the
security of our scheme in the honest-but-curious setting. However, as soon as the server can be
malicious, the collision resistance property will be very important, else the server might forge known
valid states, which would break the security.
We will denote by MQF the distribution obtained by sampling as above the index k and trapdoor
tk according to Gen(1
n), the y uniformly in the elements of R having two preimages, and the β
uniformly in E, and then outputting ((tk, y, β), (k, y, β)).
Lemma 3.1. Ideal QFactory Protocol 3.2 is a PSRQG protocol as described in Definition 3.2
(with M having the distribution MQF ) if the function gk(x, x
′, β) (restricted on x, x′ such that
fk(x) = fk(x
′)) is a hard-core function for fk.
Proof. We can see that Protocol 3.2 is identical with Protocol 3.1 with M = MQF (since the Client
having tk can determine if it aborts or not), apart from the fact that in Protocol 3.2 the state
received by the server is |+θ〉, while in Protocol 3.1 is |+r〉.
Now we use the fact that gk is a hard-core function. By definition 2.8, for a QPT adversary
that has access to m = (k, y = fk(x), β) the value of the hard-core function gk(x, x
′, β) = 4θ/pi
where x, x′ are the unique preimages of y, is indistinguishable (up to negligible probability) to
that of a random value r. It follows that such adversary cannot distinguish (apart with negligible
probability) whether he received the state |+θ〉 as in Protocol 3.2 or the state |+r〉 as in the ideal
functionality described on Protocol 3.1, and therefore satisfies Eq. 8).
It is not sufficient to prove that given the image y = fk(x) it is hard to obtain the exact value of
the function g (we will omit the k if it is clear from the context), we want the stronger requirement
that given y, a QPT adversary obtains no advantage in distinguishing the value of g (the classical
description of the state), from a totally random value r. Intuitively, what Protocol 3.2 achieves,
5We call this a “qubit factory”, since we use this protocol to produce strings of qubits.
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is that it produces (truly) random qubits in states that are pseudo-secret, i.e. their classical
description is computationally unknown to anyone that does not have access to the trapdoor tk
(i.e. the server).
4 The Real Protocol
We assume the existence6 of a family {fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}k∈K of trapdoor one-way functions
that are two-regular and collision resistant (or the weaker second preimage resistance property, see
Remark 3.1) even against a quantum adversary. For any y, we will denote by x(y) and x′(y) the
two unique different preimages of y by fk (if the y is clear, we may remove it). Note that because
of the two-regularity property m ≥ n − 1. We use subscripts to denote the different bits of the
strings.
Protocol 4.1 Real QFactory Protocol
Requirements:
Public: A family F = {fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} of trapdoor one-way functions that are quantum-
safe, two-regular and collision resistant (or second preimage resistant, see Remark 3.1)
Input:
– Client: uniformly samples a set of random three-bits strings α = (α1, · · · , αn−1) where αi ←
{0, 1}3, and runs the algorithm (k, tk)← GenF (1n). The α and k are public inputs (known to both
parties), while tk is the “private” input of the Client.
Stage 1: Preimages superposition
– Client: instructs Server to prepare one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and second register initiated at |0〉m
– Client: returns k to Server and the Server applies Ufk using the first register as control and the
second as target
– Server: measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y and
returns this result y to the Client. Here, an honest Server would have a state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗ |y〉 with
fk(x) = fk(x
′) = y and y ∈ Im fk.
Stage 2: Squeezing
– Client: instructs the Server to measure all the qubits (except the last one) of the first register in
the
{|0〉 ± eαipi/4 |1〉} basis. Server obtains the outcomes b = (b1, · · · , bn−1) and returns the result
b to the Client
– Client: using the trapdoor tk computes x, x
′. Then check if the nth bit of x and x′ (corresponding
to the y received in stage 1) are the same or different. If they are the same, returns abort, otherwise,
obtains the classical description of the Server’s state.
Output: If the protocol is run honestly, when there is no abort, the state that Server has is |+θ〉,
where the Client (only) knows the classical description (see Theorem 4.1):
θ =
pi
4
(−1)xn
n−1∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi) mod 8 (9)
Remarks: The first thing to note is that the server should not only be unable to guess θ from his
classical communications, but he should also be unable to distinguish it from a random string with
6See Section 6 for our function. With that choice, we are guaranteed that the last bits of the two preimages are
always different, and thus no need for an abort. We keep the protocol general so that different functions can be used.
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probability greater than negligible. We will prove this later, but for now it is enough to point out
that θ depends on the pre-images x and x′ of y (which the Client can obtain using tk).
The second thing to note is that previously, in Protocol 3.2 and in Theorem 3.1, we used the
variable β. In our case, β corresponds to both αi’s and b. While our expression resembles the inner
product in the Goldreich-Levin (GL) theorem, it differs in a number of places and our proof (that
θ is a hard-core function), while it builds on GL theorem proof, is considerably more complicated.
Details can be found in the security proof, but here we simply mention the differences: (i) our case
involves three-bits rather than a predicate, and the different bits, if we view them separately, may
not be independent, (ii) we have a term (x− x′) rather than a single preimage, so rather than the
one-way property of the function we will need the second preimage resistance and (iii) for the same
reason, if we view our function as an inner product, it can take both negative and positive values
((x− x′) could be negative).
A third thing to note is that we have singled-out the last qubit of the first register, as the
qubit that will be the output qubit. One could have a more general protocol where the output
qubit is chosen randomly, or, for example, in the set of the qubits that are known to have different
bit values between x and x′, but this would not improve our analysis so we keep it like this for
simplicity. Moreover, while the “inner product” normally involves the full string x that one tries
to invert, in our case, it does not include one of the bits (the last) of the string we wish to invert.
It is important to note, that it does not change anything to our proofs, since if one can invert all
the string apart from one bit with inverse polynomial probability of success, then trivially one can
invert the full string with inverse polynomial probability (by randomly guessing the remaining bit
or by trying out both values of that bit). Therefore all the proofs by contradiction are still valid
and in the remaining, for notational simplicity, we will take the inner products to involve all n bits.
4.1 Correctness and intuition
Theorem 4.1. If both the Client and the Server follow Protocol 4.1, the protocol aborts when
xn = x
′
n = f
−1
k (y), while otherwise the Server ends up with the output (single) qubit being in the
state |+θ〉, where θ is given by Eq. (9).
Proof. In the first stage, before the first measurement, but after the application of Ufk , the state
is
∑
x |x〉 ⊗ |fk(x)〉. What the measurement does, is that it collapses the first register in the equal
superposition of the two unique preimages of the measured y = fk(x) = fk(x
′), in other words in the
state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉. It is not possible, even for malicious adversary (not considered here), to force
the output of the measurement to be a given y (see [Aar05] for relation of PostBQP with BQP).
This completes the first stage of the protocol. Before proceeding with the proof of correctness we
make three observations.
By the second preimage resistance property of the trapdoor function, learning x is not sufficient
to learn x′ but with negligible probability, and intuitively, by the stronger collision resistance
property, even a malicious server cannot forge a state |x〉+ |x′〉 (with f(x) = f(x′)) fully known to
him.
Then, we examine what happens if the last bit of x and x′ are the same and see why the protocol
aborts. In this case, in the first register, the last qubit is in product form with the remaining state,
and therefore any further measurements in stage 2 do not affect it, leaving it in the state |xn〉.
Because of this, the output state is not of the form of Eq. (9), while including this states in the set
of possible outputs would change considerably our analysis.
Finally, we should note that the resulting state is essentially a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state [GHZ89]: let G be the set of bits positions where x and x′ differ (which include n –
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(a) End of Stage 1: The yellow qubits are in a big
GHZ-like state. The server does not know which
qubits are in the GHZ state, and which qubits are
not (in red).
|+θ〉
+α2
−α3
+α6
−α8
+α9
(b) End of Stage 2: Measuring any qubit in the
GHZ state will rotate the last (ouput) qubit de-
pending on the angle (and result) of the measure-
ment.
Figure 1: A simplified representation of the protocol. The red and yellow ellipses represent the
qubits, the inner circle contains the bits of x and the outer circle contains the bits of x′. The central
qubit is the last one, which is not measured and which will be the output qubit.
output qubit), while G¯ is the set where they are identical. The state is then (where we no longer
keep the qubits in order, but group them depending on their belonging to G or G¯):(⊗i∈G¯ |xi〉 )⊗ (⊗j∈G |xj〉+⊗j∈G |xj ⊕ 1〉 ) (10)
This can be rewritten as (up to trivial re-normalization):(⊗i∈G¯ |xi〉 )⊗ (∏
j∈G
Xxj
)( |0 · · · 0〉G + |1 · · · 1〉G ) (11)
It is now evident that the state at the end of Stage 1 is a tensor product of isolated |0〉 and |1〉
states, and a GHZ state with random X’s applied. You can find on Figure 1 an illustration of this
state7, before and after the Stage 2.
The important thing to note, is that the set G, that determines which qubits are in the GHZ
state and which qubits are not, is not known to the server (apart from the fact that the position
of the output qubit belongs to G since otherwise the protocol aborts). Moreover, this set denotes
the positions where x and x′ differ, which is given by the XOR of the two preimages x ⊕ x′ :=
(x1⊕x′1, · · · , xn⊕x′n). Because of second preimage resistance of the function, the server should not
be able to invert and obtain x⊕x′ apart with negligible probability (without access to the trapdoor
tk). This in itself does not guarantee that the Server cannot learn any information about the XOR
of the preimages, but we will see that the actual form of the state is such that being able to obtain
information would lead to invert the full XOR and thus break the second preimage resistance.
7GHZ-states when viewed as graph states correspond to stars due to the corresponding graph as we can see here
too.
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Now let us continue towards Stage 2. Measuring a qubit (other than the last one) in G¯ has no
effect on the last qubit (since it is disentangled). When the qubit index is in G, then measuring
it at angle αipi/4 gives a phase to the output qubit of the form (−(−1)xiαi + 4bi)pi/4 as one can
easily check8. Therefore, adding all the phases leads to the output state being:
|+θ〉 ; θ = pi
4
(−1)xn
 ∑
i∈G\{n}
(− αi(−1)xi + 4bi)
 mod 8 (12)
Because θ is defined modulo 2pi and −4 = 4 mod 8, we can express the output angle in a more
symmetrical way:
θ =
pi
4
(−1)xn
(
n−1∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)
(
4bi + αi
))
mod 8 (13)
Note that because the angles are defined modulo 2pi, one can represent this angle as a 3-bits string
B˜ (interpretable as an integer) such that θ := B˜ × pi4 and eventually remove the (−1)xn if needed
by choosing the suitable convention in defining x and x′.
A final remark is that in an honest run of this protocol, the measurement outcomes bi and y are
uniformly chosen from {0, 1} and Im(fk) respectively. This justifies why in the honest-but-curious
model we can view the protocol as sampling randomly the different α, y, b’s.
5 Privacy against QHBC adversaries
Here we will prove the security of Protocol 4.1 against QHBC adversaries (Definition 2.15). It
can easily be generalised for specious adversaries (Definition 2.14). Before proceeding further, it
is worth stressing that this security level has three-fold importance. Firstly, the QHBC model
concerns any application of PSQRG that involves a protocol where the adversaries are third parties
that have access to the classical communication and nothing else. In this case, we can safely
assume that the quantum part of the protocol is followed honestly and we only require to prove
that the third parties learn nothing about the classical description of the state from the classical
public communication. Second case of interest is scenarios where the “server” does not intend to
sabotage/corrupt the computation but may be interested to learn (for free) extra information. In
such case, the protocol should be followed honestly, since any non-reversible deviation other than
copying classical information could corrupt the computation. Finally, the QHBC case, as in the
classical setting, is a first step towards proving the full security against malicious adversaries, as
we will discuss in Section 7).
Theorem 5.1. Protocol 4.1 realises a PSRQG Ideal Protocol (as in Definition 3.2) that is private
with respect to this ideal protocol (as in Definition 2.13) against a QHBC server A (Definition 2.15).
Before proving the privacy with respect to the ideal functionality (see below for construction
of simulators), the first step is to show that the corresponding ideal protocol (Definition 2.11) is
a PSRQG. By Theorem 3.1 this reduces to proving that the classical description is a hard-core
function with respect to fk.
8The (−1)xi -term arises because of the commutation of Xxii with the measurement angle, and the final Xxnn gate
gives an overall (−1)xn to the angle of deviation
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Theorem 5.2. The function θ given here
θ =
pi
4
(
n−1∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi)
)
mod 8 (14)
as was defined in Protocol 4.1, is a hard-core function with respect to fk.
NB: here the collision resistance is not needed and is replaced by the weaker second preimage resis-
tance property.
Sketch Proof of Theorem 5.2. In Protocol 4.1, the adversary (Server) can only use the classical
information that he possesses (k, y, α, b) in order to try and guess with some probability the value
of θ in the case that there is no abort. Since the adversary follows the honest protocol, the choices
of y, b are truly random (and not determined by the adversary as he could in the malicious case).
Outline of sketch proof: We first express the classical description of the state into expressions
for each of the corresponding three bits. The aim is to prove that it is impossible to distinguish the
sequence of these three bits from three random bits with non-negligible probability. To show this we
follow five steps. In Step 1 we express each of the the bits as a sum mod two, of an inner product
(of the form present in GL theorem) and some other terms. In Step 2 we show that guessing the
sum modulo two of the two preimages breaks the second preimage resistance of the function and
thus is impossible. We assume that the adversary can achieve some inverse polynomial advantage
in guessing certain predicates and in the remaining steps we show that in that case he can obtain
a polynomial inversion algorithm for the one-way function fk, and thus reach the contradiction. In
Step 3 we use the Vazirani-Vazirani Theorem 2.3 to reduce the proof of hard-core function to a
number of single hard-core bits (predicates). In Step 4 we use a Lemma that allows us to fix all
but one variable in each expression, with an extra cost that is an inverse polynomial probability and
therefore the (fixed variables) guessing algorithm still needs to have negligible success probability.
Finally, in Step 5, we reduce all the predicates in a form of a known hard-core predicate XOR
with a function that involves variables not included in that predicate. Using the previous step, it
reduces to guessing the XOR of a hard-core predicate with a constant, which is bounded by the
probability of guessing the (known to be hard-core) predicate.
Here we give the sketch described above, while the full proof can be found in the Appendix B.
Let us start by defining
B˜ = B˜1B˜2B˜3 =
(
n−1∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi)
)
mod 8 (15)
where B˜i are single bits. Moreover, we treat x, x
′ as vectors in {0, 1}n; we define α(j) = (α(j)1 , · · · , α(j)n−1)
the vector that involves the j ∈ {1, 2, 3} bit of each of three-bit strings α, and we define x˜ := x⊕x′.
We define z as a vector in {−1, 0, 1}n defined as the element-wise differences of the bits of x
and x′, i.e. zi = xi − x′i. Finally, as in GL theorem, we use the notation for the inner product
〈a, b〉 = ∑n−1i=1 aibi.
We will prove that any QPT adversary A having all the classical information that Server has
(y, α, b), can guess B˜ with at most negligible probability
Pr
x←{0,1}n
α←{0,1}3n
b←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), α(1), α(2), α(3), b) = B˜1B˜2B˜3] ≤ 1
8
+ negl(n) (16)
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where for simplicity we denote the function f instead of fk. This means that the adversary A cannot
distinguish B˜ from a random three-bit string with non-negligible probability and thus Protocol 4.1
is PSRQG as given in Definition 3.2.
Step 1: We decompose Eq. (15) into three separate bits, and use the variable x˜, z defined above.
B˜3 = 〈x˜, α(3)〉 mod 2
B˜2 = 〈x˜, α(2)〉 mod 2⊕ h2(z, α(3))
B˜1 = 〈x˜, α(1)〉 mod 2⊕ h1(z, α(3), α(2), b) (17)
where the derivation and exact expressions for the functions h1, h2 are given in Appendix B. We
notice from Eq. (17) that each bit includes a term of the form 〈x˜, α(i)〉 mod 2 which on its own is
a hard-core predicate following the GL theorem.
Step 2: By the second preimage resistance we have:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x′ such that f(x) = f(x′) and x 6= x′] ≤ negl(n)⇒
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x′ ⊕ x = x˜] ≤ negl(n) (18)
For each bit j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, separately we assume that the adversary can achieve an advantage in
guessing the x˜ which is 12 + εj(n). Then, similarly to GL theorem, we prove that if this εj(n)
is inverse polynomial, this leads to contradiction with Eq. (18) since one can obtain an inverse-
polynomial inversion algorithm for the one-way function f .
Step 3: While each bit includes terms that on its own it would make it hard-core predicate (as
stated in Step 1), if we XOR the overall bit with other bits it could destroy this property. To
proceed with the proof that B˜ is hard-core function we use the Vazirani-Vazirani theorem which
states that it suffices to show that individual bits as well as combinations of XOR’s of individual
bits are all hard-core predicates. In this way one evades the need to show explicitly that the guesses
for different bits are not correlated. To proceed with the proof, we use a trick that “disentangles”
the different variables.
Step 4: We would like to be able to fix one variable and vary only the remaining, while in the
same time maintain some bound on the guessing probability.
The advantage εj(n) that we assume the adversary has for guessing one bit (or an XOR) is
calculated “on average” over all the random choices of (x˜, α(i), b). Using Theorem 5.3 we can fix
one-by-one all but one variable (applying the lemma iteratively, see Appendix B). With suitable
choices, the cardinality of the set of values that satisfies all these conditions is O(2nεj(n)) for each
iteration. Unless εj(n) is negligible, this size is an inverse polynomial fraction of all values. This
suffices to reach the contradiction. The actual inversion probability that we will obtain is simply a
product of the extra cost of fixing the variables with the standard GL inversion probability. This
extra cost is exactly the ratio of the cardinality of the Good sets (defined below) to the set of all
values and is O(εvi(n)).
Lemma 5.3. Let Pr
(v1,··· ,vk)|vj←{0,1}n∀j
[Guessing] ≥ p + ε(n), then for any variable vi, ∃ a set
Goodvi ⊆ {0, 1}n of size at least ε(n)2 2n, where ∀ vi ∈ Goodvi
Pr
(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)|vj∈{0,1}n
[Guessing] ≥ p+ ε(n)
2
where the probability is taken over all variables except vi.
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Step 5: If the expression we wish to guess involves XOR of terms that depend on different variables,
then by using Step 4 we can fix the variables of all but one term. Then we note that trying to
guess a bit (that depends on some variable and has expectation value close to 1/2) is at least as
hard as trying to guess the XOR of that bit with a constant. For example, if the bit we want to
guess is 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2⊕h(z, r2, r3)] and we have a bound on the guessing probability where only r1
is varied, then we have: 9
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2⊕ h(z, r2, r3)] ≤
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2]
We note that all bits of B˜ and their XOR’s can be brought in this form. Then using this, we
can now prove security, as the r.h.s. is exactly in the form where the GL theorem provides an
inversion algorithm for the one-way function f . For details, see Appendix B.
We now return and prove Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. In the proof we use QHBC adversaries, but following closely the more gen-
eral Specious adversaries, we can see that it would easily generalise. The proof has two steps. In
the first step of the proof, using the operators Ti (as per definition of specious) and the existence
of certain fixed state (see below) the simulator can reproduce the real view of the Server, if he can
reproduce the honest state ρi(ρin) of the corresponding part of the protocol. The second step of
the proof is to notice that apart from the last step of the protocol (decision to abort or not), the
(only) secret input tk of the Client plays no role, and thus the simulator can reproduce the view
of the Server without calling the ideal functionality. Finally, the simulator of the last step of the
protocol, calls the ideal functionality (and thus qi = 1 in Eq. (4)) and receives the decision to abort
(without access to the secret tk).
Step 1: We use the no-extra information lemma from [KW17]:
Lemma 5.4 (No-extra Information (from [KW17])). Let ΠU = (A,B, n) be a correct protocol for
two party evaluation of U . Let A˜ be any -specious adversary. Then there exists an isometry
Ti : A˜i → Ai ⊗ Aˆ and a (fixed) mixed state ρˆi ∈ D(Aˆi) such that for all joint input states ρin,
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I)(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)), ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin)
)
≤ 12
√
2 (19)
where ρi(ρin) is the state in the honest run and ρ˜i(A˜, ρin) is the real state (with the specious
adversary A˜).
By setting  = 0 (as QHBC) and using the inverse of the isometry Ti, we have
10
ρ˜i(S˜, ρin) = T
−1
i ⊗ I(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin)) (20)
and the operation Si of the simulator for any step, consists of generating ρi(ρin) (see next part
of the proof), tensor it with the fixed state ρˆi and apply the inverse of the isometry Ti. This
9Here and in the full proof, when we compare winning probabilities for QPT adversaries, it is understood that we
take the adversary that maximises these probabilities.
10We denote the two parties C for Client and S for Server and their corresponding spaces (instead of the generic
A,B used in the definitions).
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recovers exactly the real state ρ˜i(S˜, ρin) and thus tracing out the system of the Client to obtain
the simulated view νi(S˜, ρin) gives (δ = 0)-private with respect to the ideal protocol (see Eq. (5)).
Step 2: We give below the honest states at the two steps of the protocol before the Server
(classically) communicates with the Client, noting that a simulator (with no access to the private
information tk) could interact with the Server (instead of the Client) just following the normal
steps of the protocol, using the public inputs (k, α).
• State after the Server measures the second register:
(|k, tk, α〉)C ⊗
(|k, α〉 ⊗ (|x〉+ ∣∣x′〉)⊗ |y〉)
S
(21)
• State after the Server measures the first registers in α angles:
(|k, tk, α, y〉)C ⊗ (|k, α, y〉 ⊗ |b〉 ⊗ |Output〉)S (22)
where |Output〉 = |+θ〉 if there is no abort, while |Output〉 = |xn〉 otherwise.
The final state is
ρf (ρin) = (|k, tk, α, b〉)C ⊗ (|k, α, y, b〉 ⊗ |+θ〉 ⊗ |no− abort〉)S if no abort
= (|k, tk, α, b〉)C ⊗ (|k, α, y, b〉 ⊗ |xn〉 ⊗ |abort〉)S if abort (23)
To obtain the corresponding view, the Simulator calls the ideal functionality, but only uses the
abort/no− abort decision, and otherwise acts as in previous steps: Generates the state ρˆf (from the
no-extra information lemma), obtains the final state ρf (ρin) by running the actual protocol until
the previous step and adding the extra register |abort〉 / |no− abort〉, and then applies the inverse
of the isometry Tf and traces out the Client’s registers. Note that, as given in the definitions, all
operators used correspond to polynomially-sized quantum circuits and therefore the Simulator is
also QPT.
Before moving to the constructions of trapdoor functions with the required properties and
discussing the malicious case, we need to make an important observation. The ideal Protocol 3.1
other than the classical information (k, y, α, b), returns the state |+θ〉 to the Server. The security
of our real Protocol 4.1 that we proved is with respect to the ideal protocol (i.e. no information
beyond that of the ideal protocol is obtained). However, having access to (a single copy) of the
state |+θ〉 can (and does) give some non-negligible information on the classical description of that
specific θ. For example, by making a measurement one can rule-out one of the eight states with
certainty. This, naively, would appear to be in contradiction with the properties of the function
we have (where we prove that one can have only negligible advantage in guessing θ). This is no
different from the SRQG functionality, that the server can obtain some information on rm. The
resolution to this apparent contradiction, is that the basis of the proof of the hard-core property of
θ with respect to the function, is that one can repeat the same guessing algorithm keeping same x
(or y) but varying α’s. However, to obtain any information from the (output) qubit, one needs to
measure it and disturb it. Then repeating the experiment the probability of obtaining the same y a
second time (and thus having prepared the same θ) is negligible for any QPT adversary (if one can
repeat only polynomial number of times). Therefore, this one-shot extra information on θ, cannot
be distinguished from a one-shot information on a truly random rm.
19
6 Function Constructions
For our Protocol 4.1 we need a trapdoor one-way function that is also quantum-safe, two-regular
and second preimage resistant (or the stronger collision resistance property). These properties
may appear to be too strong to achieve, however, we give here methods to construct functions
that achieve these properties starting from trapdoor one-way functions that have fewer (more
realistic) conditions, and we specifically give one example that achieves all the desired properties.
In particular we give:
• A general construction given either (i) an injective, homomorphic (with respect to any oper-
ation11) trapdoor one-way function or (ii) a bijective trapdoor one-way function, to obtain
a two-regular, second preimage resistant12, trapdoor one-way function. In both cases the
quantum-safe property is maintained (if the initial function has this property, so does the
constructed function).
• (taken from [MP12]) A method of how to realise injective quantum-safe trapdoor functions
derived from the LWE problem, that has certain homomorphic property.
• A way to use the first construction with the trapdoor from [MP12] that requires a number
of modifications, including relaxation of the notion of two-regularity. The resulting function
satisfy all the desired properties if a choice of parameters that satisfy multiple constraints,
exists.
• A specific choice of these parameters, satisfying all constraints, that leads to a concrete
function with all the desired properties.
6.1 Obtaining two-regular, collision resistant/second preimage resistant, trap-
door one-way functions
Here we give two constructions. The first uses as starting point an injective, homomorphic trapdoor
function while the second a bijective trapdoor function. While we give both constructions, we focus
on the first construction since (i) we can prove the stronger collision-resistance property and (ii) (to
our knowledge) there is no known bijective trapdoor function that is believed to be quantum-safe.
Theorem 6.1. If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor one-way functions, then there
exists a family F of two-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-way functions. Moreover the
family F is quantum-safe if and only if the family G is quantum-safe.
From now on, we consider that any function gk ∈ G has domain D and range R and let  be the
closed operation on D and ? be the closed operation on R such that gk is the morphism between
D and R with respect to these 2 operations:
gk(a) ? gk(b) = gk(a b) ∀a, b ∈ D
We also denote the operation4 onD, the inverse operation of, specifically: a b−1 = a4 b ∀a, b ∈
D and 0 be the identity element for .
Then, the family F is described by the following PPT algorithms:
11in particular it is only required to be homomorphic once - rephrase this
12In (i) we prove the stronger collision-resistant property.
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FromInj.GenF (1n)
1 : (k, tk)←$GenG(1n) // k is an index of a function from G and tk is its associated trapdoor
2 : x0←$D \ {0} // x0 6= 0 to ensure that the 2 preimages mapped to the same output are distinct
3 : k′ := (k, gk(x0)) // the description of the new function
4 : t′k := (tk, x0) // the trapdoor associated with the function fk′
5 : return k′, t′k
The Evaluation procedure receives as input an index k′ of a function from F and an element x¯
from the function’s domain (x¯ ∈ D × {0, 1}):
FromInj.EvalF (k′, x¯)
return fk′(x¯)
where every function from F is defined as:
fk′ : D × {0, 1} → R
fk′(x, c) =
{
gk(x), if c = 0
gk(x) ? gk(x0) = gk(xx0)13 , if c = 1
FromInj.InvF (k′, y, t′k)
1 : // y is an element from the image of fk′ , k
′ = (k, gk(x0)), t′k = (tk, x0)
2 : x1 := InvG(k, y, tk)
3 : x2 := x14x0
4 : return (x1, 0) and (x2, 1) // the unique 2 preimages corresponding to
5 : // an element from the image of fk′
Proof. To prove Theorem 6.1 we give below five lemmata showing that, the family F of functions
defined above, satisfies the following properties: (i) two-regular, (ii) trapdoor, (iii) one-way, (iv)
collision-resistant and (v) quantum-safe if G is quantum-safe.
Lemma 6.2 (two-regular). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic functions, then F is a family
of two-regular functions.
Proof. For every y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R, where k′ = (k, gk(x0)):
1. Since Im fk′ = Im gk and gk is injective, there exists a unique x := g
−1
k (y) such that fk′(x, 0) =
gk(x) = y.
2. Assume x′ such that fk′(x′, 1) = y. By definition fk′(x′, 1) = gk(x′x0) = y, but gk is
injective and gk(x) = y by assumption, therefore there exists a unique x
′ = x4x0 such that
fk′(x
′, 1) = y
Therefore, we conclude that:
∀ y ∈ Im fk′ : f−1k′ (y) := {(g−1k (y), 0), (g−1k (y)4x0, 1)} (24)
13The last equality follows since each function gk from G is homomorphic
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Lemma 6.3 (trapdoor). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor functions, then F is
a family of trapdoor functions.
Proof. Let y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R. We construct the following inversion algorithm:
InvF (k′, y, t′k)
1 : // t′k = (tk, x0), k
′ = (k, gk(x0))
2 : x := InvG(k, y, tk)
3 : return (x, 0) and (x4x0, 1)
Lemma 6.4 (one-way). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, one-way functions, then F is
a family of one-way functions.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. We assume that a QPT adversary A can invert any function
in F with non-negligible probability P (i.e. given y ∈ Im fk′ to return a correct preimage of the
form (x′, b) with probability P ). We then construct a QPT adversary A′ that inverts a function
in G with the same non-negligible probability P reaching the contradiction since G is one-way by
assumption.
From Eq. (24) of Theorem 6.2 we know the two preimages of y are: (i) (g−1k (y), 0) and (ii)
(g−1k (y)4x0, 1). We see that information on g−1k (y) is obtain in both cases, i.e. obtaining any of
these two preimages, is sufficient to recover g−1k (y) if x0 is known. We now construct an adversary
A′ that for any function gk : D → R, inverts any output y = gk(x) with the same probability P
that A succeeds.
A′(k, y)
1 : x0←$D \ {0}// A′ knows x0, but is not given to A
2 : k′ := (k, gk(x0))
3 : (x′, b)← A(k′, y)
4 : if ((b == 0) ∧ (gk(x′) = y) then
5 : // equivalent to A succeeded in returning the first preimage
6 : return x′
7 : elseif ((b == 1) ∧ (gk(x′x0)) = y) then
8 : // A succeeded in returning the second preimage
9 : return x′x0// A′ uses x0 known from step 1
10 : else // A failed in giving any of the preimages (happens with probability 1− P )
11 : return 0
Lemma 6.5 (collision-resistance). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, one-way functions,
then any function f ∈ F is collision resistant.
Proof. Assume there exists a QPT adversary A that given k′ = (k, gk(x0)) can find a collision
(y, (x1, b1), (x2, b2)) where fk(x1, b1) = fk′(x2, b2) = y with non-negligible probability P . From Eq.
(24) we know that the two preimages are of the form (x, 0), (x4x0, 1) where gk(x) = y. It follows
that when A is successful, by comparing the first arguments of the two preimages, can recover x0.
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We now construct a QPT adversary A′ that inverts the function gk with the same probability
P , reaching a contradiction:
A′(k, gk(x))
1 : k′ = (k, gk(x))
2 : (y, (x1, b1), (x2, b2)) ∧ x1 6= x2 ← A(k′)// where y is an element from the image of fk′
3 : if f(x1, b1) = f(x2, b2) = y
4 : return x = x14x2
5 : else // A failed to find collision of fk′ ; happens with probability (1− P )
6 : return 0
Lemma 6.6 (quantum-safe). If G is a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions, with properties
as above, then F is also a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions.
Proof. The properties that require to be quantum-safe is the one-wayness and collision resistance.
Both these properties of F that we derived above were proved using reduction to the hardness
(one-wayness) of G. Therefore if G is quantum-safe, its one-wayness is also quantum-safe and thus
both properties of F are also quantum-safe.
Theorem 6.7. If G is a family of bijective, trapdoor one-way functions, then there exists a family
F of two-regular, second preimage resistant, trapdoor one-way functions. Moreover ,the family F
is quantum-safe if and only if the family G is quantum-safe.
The family F is described by the following PPT algorithms, where each function gk ∈ G has
domain D and range R:
FromBij.GenF (1n)
1 : (k1, tk1)←$GenG(1n)
2 : (k2, tk2)←$GenG(1n)
3 : k′ := (k1, k2)
4 : t′k := (tk1 , tk2)
5 : return k′, t′k
FromBij.EvalF (k′, x¯)
return fk′(x¯)
where every function from F is defined as:
fk′ : D × {0, 1} → R
fk′(x, c) =
{
gk1(x), if c = 0
gk2(x), if c = 1
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FromBij.InvF (k′, y, t′k)
1 : // y is an element from the image of fk′ , k
′ = (k1, k2), t′k = (tk1 , tk2 )
2 : x1 := InvG(k1, y, tk1)
3 : x2 := InvG(k2, y, tk2)
4 : return (x1, 0) and (x2, 1) // the unique 2 preimages corresponding to
5 : // an element from the image of fk′
The proof of Theorem 6.7, using the family of function defined above, follows same steps as of
Theorem 6.1 and is given in the Appendix C.
6.2 Injective, homomorphic quantum-safe trapdoor one-way function from LWE
(taken from [MP12])
We outline the Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] construction of injective trapdoor one-way functions,
naturally derived from the Learning With Errors problem. At the end we comment on the homo-
morphic property of the function, since this is crucial in order to use this function as the basis to
obtain our desired two-regular, collision resistant trapdoor one-way functions.
The algorithm below generates the index of an injective function and its corresponding trapdoor.
The matrix G used in this procedure, is a fixed matrix (whose exact form can be seen in [MP12])
for which the function from the family G with index G can be efficiently inverted.
LWE.GenG(1n)
1 : A′←$Zn×m¯q
2 : // D denotes the element-wise gaussian distribution with mean 0
3 : // and standard deviation αq on matrices of size n¯× kn
4 : R←$Dm¯×knαq // trapdoor information
5 : A := (A′, G−A′R) // concatenation of matrices A’ and G - A’R, representing the index of the function
6 : return A,R
The actual description of the injective trapdoor function is given in the Evaluation algorithm
below, where each function from G is defined on: gK : Znq × Lm → Zmq , and L is the domain of the
errors in the LWE problem (the set of integers bounded in absolute value by µ):
LWE.EvalG(K, (s, e))
1 : y := gK(s, e) = s
tK + et
2 : return y
The inversion algorithm returns the unique preimage (s, e) corresponding to bt ∈ Im(gK). The
algorithm uses as a subroutine the efficient algorithm InvG for inverting the function gG, with G
the fixed matrix mentioned before.
LWE.InvG(K, tK , bt)
1 : b′t := bt
[
R
I
]
2 : (s′, e′) := InvG(b′)
3 : s := s′
4 : e := b−Kts
5 : return s, e
We examine now whether the functions gK are homomorphic with respect to some operation.
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Given a = (s1, e1) ∈ Znq × Lm and b = (s2, e2) ∈ Znq × Lm, the operation ? is defined as:
(s1, e1) ? (s2, e2) = (s1 + s2 mod q, e1 + e2)
Given y1 = gK(a) ∈ Zmq and y2 = gK(b) ∈ Zmq , the operation  is defined as:
y1 y2 = y1 + y2 mod q
Then, we can easily verify that:
gK(s1, e1) + gK(s2, e2) mod q = s1
tK + e1
t + s2
tK + e2
t mod q =
(s1 + s2 mod q)
tK + (e1 + e2)
t = gK((s1 + s2) mod q, e1 + e2)
However, the sum of two error terms, each being bounded by µ, may not be bounded by µ. This
means that the function is not (properly) homomorphic. Instead, what we conclude is that as long
the vector e1 + e2 lies inside the domain of gK , then gK is homomorphic. To address this issue,
we will need to define a weaker notion of 2-regularity, and a (slight) modification of the FromInj
construction to provide a desired function starting from the trapdoor function of [MP12].
6.3 A suitable δ-2 regular trapdoor function
Using the homomorphic injective trapdoor function of Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] and the
construction defined in the proof of Theorem 6.1, we derive a family F of collision-resistant trapdoor
one-way function, but with a weaker notion of 2-regularity, called δ-2 regularity:
Definition 6.1 (δ-2 regular). A family of functions (fi)i←GenF is said to be δ-2 regular, with
δ ∈ [0, 1] if:
Pr
i←GenF ,y∈Im(fi)
[ |f−1i (y)| = 2 ] ≥ δ
Given this definition, we should note here that in Protocol 4.1 we need to modify the abort
case to include the possibility that the image y obtained from the measurement does not have two
preimages (something that happens with at most probability (1− δ)).
Theorem 6.8 (Existence of a δ-2 regular trapdoor function family). There exists a family of
functions that are δ-2 regular (with δ at least as big as a fixed constant), trapdoor, one-way, collision
resistant and quantum-safe, assuming that there is no quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve
SIVPγ for γ = poly(n).
Proof. To prove this theorem, we define a function similar to the one in the FromInj construction,
where the starting point is the function defined in [MP12]. Crucial for the security is a choice of
parameters that satisfy a number of conditions given by Theorem 6.9 and proven in Appendix D.
The proof is then completed by providing a choice of parameters given in Theorem 6.10 that satisfies
all conditions as it is shown in Appendix E.
Definition 6.2. For a given set of parameter P chosen as in Theorem 6.9, we define the following
functions, that are similar to the construction FromInj, except for the key generation that require
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an error sampled from a smaller set:
REG2.GenP(1n)
1 : A,R← LWE.GenG(1n)
2 : s0 ← Zn,1q
3 : e0 ← Dm,1α′q
4 : b0 := LWE.Eval(A, (s0 + e0))
5 : k := (A, b0)
6 : tk := (R, (s0, e0))
7 : return (k, tk)
REG2.EvalP((A, b0), (s, e, c))
1 : / s is a random element in Zn,1q , c ∈ {0, 1}
2 : / e is sampled uniformly and such that
3 : / each component is smaller than µ
4 : return LWE.Eval(A, (s, e)) + cb0
REG2.InvP((A,R, (s0, e0)), b)
1 : (s1, e1) := LWE.Inv(R, b)
2 : if ||e1 − e0||∞ ≤ µ then return ⊥
3 : return ((s1, e1, 0), (s1 − s0, e1 − e0, 1))
Note, that the pairs (s, e) and (s0, e0) correspond to x and x0 of the FromInj construction of
Subsection 6.1. The idea behind this construction is that the noise of the trapdoor is sampled
from a set which is small compared to the noise of the input function. That way, when you will
add the trapdoor together with an input, the total noise will still be small enough to stay in the
set of possible input noise with good probability, mimicking the homomorphic property needed
in Theorem 6.1. Note that the parameters need to be carefully chosen, and a trade-off between
probability of success and security exists.
Lemma 6.9 (Requirements on the parameters). For all n, q, µ ∈ Z, µ′ ∈ R, let us define:
• k := dlog(q)e
• m¯ = 2n
• ω = nk
• m := m¯+ ω = 2n+ nk
• α′ = µ′√
mq
• α = mα′
• C the constant in Lemma 2.9 of [MP12] which is around 1√
2pi
• B = 2 if q is a power of 2, and B = √5 otherwise.
Now, if for all security parameters n (dimension of the lattice), there exist q (the modulus of LWE)
and µ (the maximum amplitude of the components of the errors) such that:
1. m is such that n = o(m) (required for the injectivity of the function (see e.g. [Vai]))
2. 0 < α < 1
3. µ′ = O(µ/m) (required to have non negligible probability to have two preimages)
4. α′q ≥ 2√n (required for the LWE to SIVP reduction)
5. nα′ is poly(n) (representing, up to a constant factor, the approximation factor γ in the SIVPγ
problem)
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6. √
mµ <
q
2B
√(
C · (α · q) · (√2n+√kn+√n)
)2
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rmax
−µ′√m
(required for the correctness of the inversion algorithm - rmax represents the maximum length
of an error vector that one can correct using the [MP12] function14, and the last term is
needed in the proof of collision resistance to ensure injectivity even when we add the secret
trapdoor noise, as illustrated in Figure 2)
then the family of functions of Definition 6.2 is δ-2 regular (with δ at least as big as a fixed
constant), trapdoor, one-way and collision resistant (all these properties are true even against a
quantum attacker), assuming that there is no quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve SIV P γ
for γ = poly(n).
Proof. The proof follows by showing that the function with these constraints on the parameters is
(i) δ-2 regular, (ii) collision resistant, (iii) one-way and (iv) trapdoor. In Appendix D we give and
prove one lemma for each of those properties. For an intuition of the choice of parameters see also
Figure 2.
µ µ′ =
√
mα′q
√
mµ
rmax
Figure 2: The red circle represents the
domain of the error term from the trap-
door information, which is being sam-
pled from a Gaussian distribution. The
orange square is an approximation of
this domain, which must satisfy that its
length is much smaller (by a factor of
at least m – the dimension of the error)
than the length of the blue square, used
for the actual sampling from the domain
of the error terms, for which it is known
that the trapdoor function is invertible,
domain represented by the green circle.
The dashed part is needed to ensure
that if there is a collision (x1, x2), then
x1 = x2 ± x0.
14We chose to use the computational definition of [MP12], but this theorem can be easily extended to other
definitions of this same paper, or even to other construction of trapdoor short basis)
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6.4 Parameter Choices
Lemma 6.10 (Existence of parameters). The following set of parameters fulfills Theorem 6.9.
n = λ
k = 5 dlog(n)e+ 21
q = 2k
m¯ = 2n
ω = nk
m = m¯+ ω
µ =
⌈
2mn
√
2 + k
⌉
µ′ = µ/m
B = 2
and α, α′, C are defined like in Theorem 6.9.
The proof is given in Appendix E. As a final remark, we stress that other choices of the
parameters are possible (considering the trade-off between security and probability of success) and
we have not attempted to find an optimal set.
7 Discussion
In this work we deal with Quantum-Honest-But-Curious adversaries. Naturally, the final aim
should be to provide security against a (fully) malicious adversary/Server. There are two (linked)
issues to consider when dealing with malicious adversaries. The first issue is whether the Server
(by deviating arbitrarily) can obtain extra information about the secret classical description (of
the state supposingly prepared). The second issue is whether the actual state at the end of the
protocol is (essentially) the one that the Client believes, i.e. if the functionality provides verification.
We make remarks separately on these issues, and then conclude with an approach that could lead
in a solution to both issues.
Issue 1 (privacy): The most naive attempt for the Server to deviate in order to obtain information,
is to return y, b other than those obtained from an honest run of the protocol. Since y, b determine
(along with other parameters) the value of the secret θ a deviation there could lead to breaking
the security. For example, instead of the (truly) random y that is obtained in the honest run, the
Server can choose y such that he has information on the preimages for the given k or can choose b
adaptively depending on values of α. However, the function fk is collision-resistant, which means
that even if the adversary chooses the y he cannot find such y that both preimages are known with
a non-negligible probability. Moreover, if the Server chooses y, it means that the protocol was not
followed and thus the final output state is not going to be related with the value θ as expected. We
conjecture the hard-core function proof (Theorem 5.2) will remain valid in that case with minor
modifications. The more significant difficulty, however, comes from “mixed” strategies, where the
adversary follows partly the protocol (and thus the output qubit is correlated with the classical
secret description), and partly deviates. In those cases it is hard to quantify what information the
server has, and whether this is strictly less than that of an ideal protocol (where the state |+θ〉
gives some legitimate information).
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Issue 2 (verification): The first thing to note, is that the adversary has in his lab the output
state, and therefore (trivially) he can always apply a final-step deviation corrupting the legitimate
output. Thus when we speak of verification, we mean a correct state, up to a (reversible) deviation
on the Server’s side (as the operations Ti in the definition of specious). The second thing to stress,
is that Protocol 4.1 cannot be verifiable against a malicious Server, unless some extra mechanism
is added. There is a way, by deviating from the instructions, to corrupt the output in a way that
depends on the secret classical description (θ), but without actually learning any information about
the same classical description. In particular it is possible by measuring all qubits of the first register
in 3α angle to generate the state |+3θ〉 as output. This deviation does not help the Server to learn
any information about θ (protocol still “private”) but affects the output state in a “non-reversible”
way and thus compromises the verifiability.
A way forward: The ultimate goal would be to extent QFactory into a Quantum Universal
Composable protocol [Unr10] in order to be able to compose it with any other protocol, or at least
to proof the security against a malicious adversary. In classical protocols (and recently in quantum
too [KMW17]), the way to boost the security from honest-but-curious to malicious is to introduce
a “compiler” (e.g. using the construction in [GMW87] or a cut-and-choose technique) and boost
the security by essentially enforcing the honest-but-curious behaviour to malicious adversaries (or
abort). In our case, the protocol is simple enough, having single qubits as outputs. One method
could be to prepare a large string of qubits, and have the Client choose a random subset of those
and instructs the Server to measure them. By observing the correct statistics on the “test” qubits,
one can infer the correct preparation. This is closely related to the parameter-estimation in QKD,
and with self-testing [MYS12]. The exact details are involved, as the analogous cases of compilers,
parameter-estimation and self-testing suggests, and will be explored in a future publication.
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Appendices
A PSRQG within several applications
In Subsection 1.2 we listed several applications that can use the PSRQG functionality to allow
for fully classical parties to participate using, a potentially malicious, quantum server. Here we
give details on how to use the exact output of our QFactory protocol in these applications. We
emphasize that in all protocols in which the “server” used by the classical party is a malicious
party, the cost of using our QFactory construction is that the security becomes computational and
applies in the quantum-honest-but-curious setting.
1. In the quantum homomorphic encryption scheme AUX in [BJ15], where the target quantum
computation must have constant T -gate depth, using our QFactory protocol would allow
a classical client to participate (delegate such computation) provided, of course, that the
input/output are classical. Specifically, as the input is classical, the client will instruct the
server to prepare a quantum state of the classical one-time pad of this input (and then
the client will also send to the server a classical homomorphic encryption of the classical
one-time pad key of each of the input’s bits). Moreover, for every T -gate in the quantum
computation, the auxiliary qubits in the evaluation key can be produced using QFactory:{|+〉 , P |+〉 = ∣∣+2pi/4〉 , Z |+〉 = ∣∣+4pi/4〉 , ZP |+〉 = ∣∣+6pi/4〉}.
We note that due to the use of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme, the AUX
protocol [BJ15] has computationally security, thus, the computational security offered by the
QFactory is not downgrading the security of this protocol.
2. In the blind delegated quantum computation protocol of [BFK09], the client needs to prepare
and send to the server qubits, randomly chosen, from the set of states {|+〉 , ∣∣+pi/4〉 , ..., ∣∣+7pi/4〉}.
This is exactly the set of states of Eq. (7) which are given by the QFactory. It follows that
our construction eliminates the need for quantum communication and thus any classical client
can use this protocol.
3. The verifiable blind quantum computation protocol in [FKD17], the only quantum ability
that the verifier needs is to prepare and send to the prover single qubits, randomly chosen,
from the set of states {∣∣+kpi/4〉}. Again, this is exactly the set of states given by the QFactory.
Therefore, the quantum communication, and thus quantum abilities of the verifier, can be
completely replaced by the QFactory functionality.
4. For the quantum key-distribution construction in [BB84], we can use two conjugate bases to
realise this protocol, namely: the diagonal basis {|+〉 , |+pi〉} and the left-right handed circular
basis {∣∣+pi/2〉 , ∣∣+3pi/2〉}. All these four quantum states can be obtained by the QFactory
protocol15. As the quantum coin flipping protocol of [BB84], the quantum money protocol
of [BOV+18], or the quantum digital signatures protocol of [WDKA15] only require, as in
[BB84], any pair of conjugate bases, this implies that we can use QFactory in a straight
forward way. On the other hand, for the quantum coin flip construction in [PCDK11], the
single qubit quantum states needed are of the form
√
a |0〉 + (−1)αi√1− a |1〉, which might
be achieved by a different construction of the PSRQG.
15Actually, if one was interested in obtaining exactly and only this set of states, we can modify the QFactory to
do so, in a way that actually simplifies the proofs too. For example, we could simply ask to measure the qubits in
the second stage in the basis {∣∣±αipi/2〉}.
30
5. In the multiparty quantum computation protocol of [KP17], the n clients need to send multiple
copies of quantum states in the set {∣∣+kpi/4〉} to the server, who entangles and measures them
all but one. Using QFactory all these states will be prepared by the server, which would enable
the n clients to be fully classical.
6. The verifiable blind quantum computation protocols in [Bro15], [FK12] or the two-party
quantum computation protocols in [KW17], [KMW17], require the honest party to prepare
single qubit states from the set of states {|0〉 , |1〉 , ∣∣+kpi/4〉}. While the QFactory primitive
can output the
∣∣+kpi/4〉 states, in order to make the honest party fully classical, we need to
change the construction of QFactory in order to also be able to output the |0〉 and |1〉 states,
and maintain the same guarantees in privacy as in the QFactory.
B Full proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. From Eq. (15) we have the definition of B˜ in terms of the three corresponding bits and we
aim to prove that it is hard-core, i.e. that Eq. (17) is satisfied. We will follow the five steps outlined
in the main text. Before that let us define some simple identities that will be used. ∀a, b, d, e ∈ N,
we have:
(a+ b) mod 8 = (a mod 8 + b mod 8) mod 8 (I1)
[(a+ b) mod 8] mod 4 = (a mod 4 + b mod 4) mod 4 (I2)
[(a+ b) mod 4] mod 2 = (a mod 2 + b mod 2) mod 2 (I3)
(2a) mod 4 = 2 · (a mod 2) (I4)
(2a) mod 8 = 2 · (a mod 4) (I5)
(2d+ e) mod 4− e mod 2 = [2d+ e− (e mod 2)] mod 4 (I6)
(2d+ e) mod 8− e mod 2 = [2d+ e− (e mod 2)] mod 8 (I7)
We now return to Eq. (15)
B˜ = g(x− x′) =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi) mod 8
where B˜ = B˜1B˜2B˜3, with B˜j ∈ {0, 1}. We also define x˜ = x⊕ x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n
be the vector defined as: zi = xi − x′i = (−1)x′i x˜i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Step 1: We will rewrite this expression in terms of single bits and obtain the expression of Eq.
(17). We have g(z) =
n∑
i=1
zi(4bi + αi) mod 8, or equivalently:
4B˜1 + 2B˜2 + B˜3 =
[(
4
n∑
i=1
zibi
)
mod 8 +
(
n∑
i=1
ziαi
)
mod 8
]
mod 8
31
We define the following terms: αi = 4α
(1)
i +2α
(2)
i +α
(3)
i , where α
(1)
i , α
(2)
i , α
(3)
i are the 3 bits of αi and
α(j) ∈ {0, 1}n are the vectors consisting of the j-th bit of all values αi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3};
S0 =
n∑
i=1
zibi ; S1 =
n∑
i=1
ziα
(1)
i
S2 =
n∑
i=1
ziα
(2)
i ; S3 =
n∑
i=1
ziα
(3)
i
We also notice that under mod 2, we have that:
Sj mod 2 =
n∑
i=1
x˜iα
(j)
i mod 2 = 〈x˜, α(j)〉 mod 2 , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then, we have:
4B˜1 + 2B˜2 + B˜3 = (
n∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4bi + αi)) mod 8 =[
4S0 +
n∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)(4α(i)1 + 2α(i)2 + α(i)3 )
]
mod 8
4B˜1 + 2B˜2 + B˜3 = (4S0 + 4S1 + 2S2 + S3) mod 8 (25)
Applying mod 2 to Eq. (25), we get:
B˜3 = (4S0 mod 2 + 4S1 mod 2 + 2S2 mod 2 + S3 mod 2) mod 2
B˜3 = S3 mod 2 = 〈x˜, α(3)〉 mod 2 (26)
If, instead we apply mod 4 to Eq. (25), we get:
2B˜2 + B˜3 = [4S0 mod 4 + 4S1 mod 4 + 2S2 mod 4 + S3 mod 4] mod 4
2B˜2 + B˜3 = [(2S2) mod 4 + S3 mod 4] mod 4. Using I4, we have:
2B˜2 + B˜3 = [2(S2 mod 2) + S3 mod 4] mod 4
B˜2 =
1
2
{[2(S2 mod 2) + S3 mod 4] mod 4− S3 mod 2}. Using I6:
B˜2 =
1
2
[2(S2 mod 2) + S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2] mod 4
B˜2 =
1
2
{
2 ·
[
(S2 mod 2) +
(S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2)
2
]}
mod 4. Using I4, we obtain:
B˜2 =
[
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2)
2
]
mod 2.
B˜2 = S2 mod 2⊕
(
S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2
2
)
32
B˜2 = 〈x˜, α(2)〉 mod 2⊕
(
S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2
2
)
(27)
Finally, we can derive B˜1:
B˜1 =
1
4 {(4S0 + 4S1 + 2S2 + S3) mod 8− (S3 mod 2)−
2
[(
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2)
2
)
mod 2
]}
Using I7:
B˜1 =
1
4 {(4S0 + 4S1 + 2S2 + S3 − (S3 mod 2)) mod 8−
2
[(
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2)
2
)
mod 2
]}
Using I5:
B˜1 =
1
4
{
2
[(
2S0 + 2S1 + S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 4
]
−
2
[(
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2)
2
)
mod 2
]}
B˜1 =
1
2
[(
2S0 + 2S1 + S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 4−
(
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2)
2
)
mod 2
]
Using I6 we can rewrite the first term, and we get:
B˜1 =
1
2
{(
S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2 +
[
2(S0 + S1) + S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
−
−
(
S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
]
mod 4−
[
S2 mod 2 +
(S3 mod 4− S3 mod 2)
2
]
mod 2
}
Combining the first and third term:
B˜1 =
1
2
{[
(S2 − S2 mod 2) + S3 − S3 mod 4
2
]
mod 2 +
+
[
2(S0 + S1) + S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
−
(
S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
]
mod 4
}
We notice that both S2 − S2 mod 2 and S3−S3 mod 42 are even, so the first big term is 0:
B˜1 =
1
2
{[
2(S0 + S1) + S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
−
(
S2 +
S3 − S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
]
mod 4
}
which can be rewritten as:
B˜1 =
1
2

2 ·
S0 + S1 +
(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
−
(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
2
 mod 4

Finally using I4, we get:
B˜1 =
S0 + S1 +
(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
−
(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
2
 mod 2
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B˜1 = S1 mod 2⊕ S0 mod 2⊕

(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
−
(
S2 +
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
2
 mod 2
B˜1 = 〈x˜, α(1)〉 mod 2⊕ 〈x˜, b〉 mod 2⊕[(
S2+
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
−
(
S2+
S3−S3 mod 2
2
)
mod 2
2
]
mod 2 (28)
Important observation: B˜1, B˜2, B˜3 all depend on the same value of x and x
′ (or x˜, or z).
Therefore, to make our analysis easier, we can consider that z and x˜ are fixed. Then, if we define
the function:
B(r) = 〈x˜, r〉 mod 2 =
(
n∑
i=1
x˜iri
)
mod 2 (29)
we can rewrite B˜3, B˜2, B˜1 as in Eq. (17) completing Step 1:
B˜3 = B
(
α(3)
)
B˜2 = B
(
α(2)
)
⊕ h2(z, α(3))
B˜1 = B
(
α(1)
)
⊕ h1(z, α(3), α(2), b) (30)
Where:
h2(z, α
(3)) := 〈z,α
(3)〉 mod 4−〈z,α(3)〉 mod 2
2 (31)
h1(z, α
(3), α(2), b) := 〈z, b〉 mod 2 ⊕ (32)
⊕
(〈z,α(2)〉+ 〈z,α(3)〉−〈z,α(3)〉 mod 22 )−(〈z,α(2)〉+ 〈z,α(3)〉−〈z,α(3)〉 mod 22 ) mod 2
2
 mod 2
Step 2: We see from Eq. (28) that each of the three bits involve a term similar to that of
the GL theorem 2.2 (the B
(
α(i)
)
term), but with two the important differences. First, there is
another term, and the bits of B˜ are XORs of the GL-looking term and that other one. The second
type of terms (that involve h1, h2) depend on variables that appear in the expressions of other
bits, potentially introducing correlations among the different bits. We will deal with the issue of
correlations in Step 3, while with the effects of having extra terms in Steps 4 and 5. Here we
deal with the second important difference, namely that the GL-looking terms (those of the form
〈x˜, r〉 mod 2) depend on x˜ rather than x in the inner product. For the remaining Step 2, we assume
that the first issue is resolved and it all reduces to GL theorem subject to having x˜ rather than x.
Since we have x˜ in our expression if we follow the same proof with that of the GL theorem we
can follow the proof until the point that we end up with obtaining a polynomial number of guesses
for x˜ of which one is the correct value with probability negligibly close to unity. Now to continue
with the proof we are lacking two elements. First, in GL theorem the use the fact that computing
f(x) given x is easy, and check one-by-one the polynomial guesses to see which one (if any) is
correct. We cannot do this since we only obtain x˜ and there is no way with no extra information to
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check if x˜ actually corresponds to a given image y = f(x) = f(x′). The second issue, is that even
if we could check this, having obtained x˜ does not contradicts the definition of one-way function
(definition 2.2).
We resolve both these issues with two observations. Observation 1: We notice that because
of the 2-regularity property of f , x˜ is uniquely determined by x (f(x) = f(x′), x˜ = x ⊕ x′). Ob-
servation 2: The assumption that our 2-regular trapdoor function f is second preimage resistant
(i.e. a QPT adversary given x, cannot find the second preimage x′, where f(x) = f(x′)) means
that:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x′ such that f(x) = f(x′)] ≤ negl(n)
As
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x′] = Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x′ ⊕ x]
we have that:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n, x) = x˜] ≤ negl(n) (33)
As we have mentioned, following the GL theorem proof we would obtain polynomially many
guesses for x˜g (where subscript g stands for guess). Now by the second preimage resistance, if
we are given x we should be unable to obtain x′ in polynomial time. However, using our poly-
nomially many guesses for x˜ and checking for each guess if f(x ⊕ x˜g) = f(x) we can obtain with
probability negligible close to unity the correct x˜ and therefore come to contradiction with Eq. (33).
Step 3: Since the different bits involve common variables, to prove that our function is hard-
core we need to consider the issue of correlations. One way to deal with this would be to prove
the independence of both the bits and of the optimal guessing algorithms. We, instead, use the
Vazirani-Vazirani Theorem 2.3, which for our case it means that it suffices to show that: B˜1, B˜2,
B˜3, B˜1 ⊕ B˜2, B˜1 ⊕ B˜3, B˜2 ⊕ B˜3, B˜1 ⊕ B˜2 ⊕ B˜3 are all hard-core predicates for f .
The most general expression that captures all these (to be proven) hard-core predicates (formed
from the subsets of {B˜1, B˜2, B˜1} ) is:
E(x, r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1 ⊕ r2〉 mod 2⊕ g(z, r2, r3) (34)
where g can be any binary function. Using 〈x˜, r1 ⊕ r2〉 mod 2 = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2 ⊕ 〈x˜, r2〉 mod 2 we
can rewrite this as
E(x, r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2⊕ g′(z, r2, r3) (35)
where g′(z, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r2〉 mod 2 ⊕ g(z, r2, r3). In other words, in order to prove that B˜1B˜2B˜3 is
a hard-core function for f , it suffices to prove that E(x, r1, r2, r3) is a hard-core predicate for f .
Step 4: In this step, we will see how we can effectively fix all but one variables, and turn Eq. (35)
to depend only on r1.
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We want to prove that if there exists a QPT algorithm A that can guess the predicate E as
given in Eq. (35), A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = E(x, r1, r2, r3) with probability non-negligible better than
1/2, then the second preimage resistance assumption is violated by constructing a QPT algorithm
A′ that, when given x can obtain x˜, A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜, with non-negligible probability.
We now assume that the advantage A has in computing is ε(n), without restricting ε(n) to
be non-negligible, aiming to reach a contradiction if this ε(n) is inverse polynomial. We therefore
assume:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r1←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = E(x, r1, r2, r3)] = 1
2
+ ε(n) (36)
Since the different variables (x, r1, r2, r3) are chosen randomly and independently we can ef-
fectively “fix” one variable. We can consider the set of values of that variable that satisfy some
condition that we need and name these values “Good” values (e.g. the guessing algorithm A to
succeed with higher than negligible probability). Then we can work with the assumption that the
fixed variable is within the “Good” set, with only caveat that at the end, whatever probability
of inversion we obtain, is conditional on the fixed variables being “Good” and thus we need to
multiply that probability with the probability that the fixed variable is “Good”. For this reason,
it is important that the probability of being “Good” (ratio of cardinality of Good values with total
values) should be at least inverse polynomial.
We will, therefore, be using the following Lemma:
Lemma B.1. Let Pr
(v1,··· ,vk)|vj←{0,1}n∀j
[Guessing] ≥ p + ε(n), then for any variable vi, ∃ a set
Goodvi ⊆ {0, 1}n of size at least ε(n)2 2n, where ∀ v˜i ∈ Goodvi
Pr
(v1,··· , ˜vi ,··· ,vk)|vj∈{0,1}n
[Guessing] ≥ p+ ε(n)
2
where the probability is taken over all variables except vi.
Proof.
p+ ε(n) ≤ 12n
∑
vi∈Goodvi Pr(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)|vj∈{0,1}n
[Guessing] +
1
2n
∑
vi /∈Goodvi Pr(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)|vj∈{0,1}n
[Guessing]
≤ 12n |Goodvi |+ 12n
∑
vi /∈Goodvi (p+
ε(n)
2 )
(37)
p+ ε(n) ≤ 1
2n
|Goodvi |+ (p+
ε(n)
2
)
ε(n)
2
2n ≤ |Goodvi | (38)
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Now we return to Eq. (36), we fix the set of Goodx, the set of inputs x such that:
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = E(x, r1, r2, r3)] ≥ 1
2
+
ε(n)
2
∀x ∈ Goodx (39)
and using Theorem 5.3 we have |Goodx| ≥ ε(n)2 2n. Note that fixing x is equivalent with fixing x˜
or z, given the definition of the 2-regular function f . Starting with Eq. (39) we can now fix r3
(conditional on x ∈ Goodx)
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = E(x, r1, r2, r3)] ≥ 1
2
+
ε(n)
4
∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 (40)
where using again Theorem 5.3 we have |Goodr3 | ≥ ε(n)4 2n. Finally, we can fix r2 (conditional on
x ∈ Goodx and r3 ∈ Goodr3)
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = E(x, r1, r2, r3)] ≥ 1
2
+
ε(n)
8
∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ ∀r2 ∈ Goodr2 (41)
and again by Theorem 5.3 we have |Goodr2 | ≥ ε(n)8 2n.
Step 5: In Eq. (41) the only variable is r1. Using Eq. (35) we can see that given that x, r2, r3
are all fixed, E(x, r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 ⊕ g′(z, r2, r3) where g′(z, r2, r3) = c is constant. Because c is
a constant, we can define A˜ = A⊕ c. Now, we can easily see that:
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2⊕ g′(z, r2, r3)]
= Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A˜(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2]
So, using Eq. (41), we obtain
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A˜(f(x), r1, r2, r3) = 〈x˜, r1〉 mod 2] ≥ 1
2
+
ε(n)
8
∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ ∀r2 ∈ Goodr2 (42)
which is exactly the expression in GL theorem. There, one obtains guesses for inversion, i.e. to
obtain x˜ with a polynomial in ε(n) probability of success, given the fixed x, r2, r3’s. Multiplying
this with the probability of actually being in Goodx and Goodr3 and Goodr2 we obtain another
polynomial in ε(n). This rules out the possibility of ε(n) being inverse polynomial, since that would
break the second preimage resistance. As we have already stated, guessing x˜ with inverse polynomial
success probability does not contradict the one-way property of the trapdoor function, but it does
contradict the second preimage resistance, since given x and x˜ one can obtain deterministically x′.
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Concretely, using GL proof to construct from A˜, a QPT algorithmA′ that obtains x˜, A′(f(x), 1n) =
x˜ for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, when, x ∈ Goodx, r3 ∈ Goodr3 and r2 ∈ Goodr2 , this algorithm A′
succeeds with probability:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜ |x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2 ]
≥ ε
2(n)
2(32n+ ε2(n))
≥ ε
2(n)
2(32n+ 1)
Then, we have:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜] ≥
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜ ∧ x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2 ] ≥
≥ Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜ |x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2 ] ·
· Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2 ]
We now see that
Pr[x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2 ] =
Pr[r2 ∈ Goodr2 |r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ x ∈ Goodx] · Pr[r3 ∈ Goodr3 |x ∈ Goodx]× Pr[x ∈ Goodx]
By construction we have Pr[x ∈ Goodx] = |Goodx|2n and Pr[r3 ∈ Goodr3 |x ∈ Goodx] =
|Goodr3 |
2n and
Pr[r2 ∈ Goodr2 |r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ x ∈ Goodx] = |Goodr2 |2n , which leads to
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜] ≥ ε
2(n)
2(32n+ 1)
· |Goodx|
2n
· |Goodr3 |
2n
· |Goodr2 |
2n
≥ ε
5(n)
128(32n+ 1)
(43)
where we can view r3 and r2 as the internal randomness of the inversion algorithm A′. It is clear
that if ε(n) is non-negligible, it means that there exists polynomial p(n) such that ε(n) = 1/p(n),
and then
Pr
x←{0,1}n
r3←{0,1}n
r2←{0,1}n
[A′(f(x), 1n) = x˜] ≥ 1
128(32n+ 1)p(n)5
(44)
38
which as explained in Step 2 breaks second preimage resistance, Eq. (33). Since all the terms
given in Step 3 (B˜i, B˜i⊕B˜j , B˜1⊕B˜2⊕B˜3) are of the form E(x, r1, r2, r3) as in Eq. (35) our analysis
suffices to prove that B˜1B˜2B˜3 is a hard-core function for f .
C Proof of Theorem 6.7
Lemma C.1 (two-regular). If G is a family of bijective functions, then F is a family of two-regular
functions.
Proof. For every y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R, where k′ = (k1, k2):
1. Since Im fk′ = Im gk1 and gk1 is bijective, there exist unique x1 := g
−1
k1
(y) such that fk′(x, 0) =
gk1(x) = y.
2. Since Im fk′ = Im gk2 and gk2 is bijective, there exist unique x2 := g
−1
k2
(y) such that fk′(x, 1) =
gk2(x) = y.
Therefore, we conclude that:
∀ y ∈ Im fk′ : f−1k′ (y) := {(g−1k1 (y), 0), (g−1k2 (y), 1)} (45)
Lemma C.2 (trapdoor). If G is a family of bijective trapdoor functions, then F is a family of
trapdoor functions.
Proof. Let y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R. We construct the following inversion algorithm:
InvF (k′, y, t′k)
1 : // t′k = (tk1 , tk2 ), k
′ = (k1, k2)
2 : x1 := InvG(k1, y, tk1)
3 : x2 := InvG(k2, y, tk2)
4 : return (x1, 0) and (x2, 1)
Lemma C.3 (one-way). If G is a family of bijective, one-way functions, then F is a family of
one-way functions.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. We assume that a PPT adversary A can invert any function
in F with non-negligible probability P (i.e. given y ∈ Im fk′ to return a correct preimage of the
form (x′, b) with probability P ). We then construct a PPT adversary A′ that inverts any function
in G with the same non-negligible probability P reaching the contradiction since G is one-way by
assumption.
From Eq. (45) we know the two preimages of y are: (i) (g−1k1 (y), 0) and (ii) (g
−1
k2
(y), 1). We now
construct an adversary A′ that for any function gk : D → R, inverts any output y = gk(x) with the
probability P/2.
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A′(kc, y)
1 : r←$ { 0, 1 }
2 : kr = kc
3 : (kr′ , tkr′ )←$GenG(1n)
4 : if r = 0 then k′ := (kr, kr′)
5 : else
6 : k′ := (kr′ , kr)
7 : (x′, b)← A(k′, y)
8 : if ((b == r) ∧ (gkr (x′) = y) then
9 : // A returns correct preimage that also corresponds to the challenge of A′
10 : return x′
11 : else // A failed in giving any of the preimages (happens with probability 1− P )
12 : // or the preimage returned corresponds to the r′ that is not the challenge (happens with probability P/2)
13 : return 0
The inversion algorithm succeeds with 1−((1−P )+P/2) = P/2 and thus reaches a contradiction.
Lemma C.4 (second preimage resistance). If G is a family of bijective, one-way functions, then,
any function f ∈ F is second preimage resistant.
Proof. Assume there exists a PPT adversary B that given k′ = (k1, k2) and (y, (x, b)) such that
fk′(x, b) = y can find (x
′, b′) such that fk′(x′, b′) = y with non-negligible probability P . From Eq.
(45) we know that the two preimages have different b’s. We now construct a PPT adversary B′
that inverts the function gkc with the same probability P , reaching a contradiction:
B′(kc, y)
1 : (k2, tk2)←$GenG(1n)
2 : x2 = g
−1
k2
(y)// using the trapdoor tk2
3 : k′ := (kc, k2)
4 : (x, 0)← B(k′, y, (x2, 1))// where y is an element from the image of fk′
5 : if fk′(x, 0) == fk′(x2, 1) == y
6 : return x
7 : else // B failed to find a second preimage; happens with probability (1− P )
8 : return 0
Lemma C.5 (quantum-safe). If G is a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions, with properties
as above, then F is also a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions.
Proof. The properties that require to be quantum-safe is the one-wayness and second preimage
resistance. Both these properties of F that we derived above were proved using reduction to the
hardness (one-wayness) of G. Therefore if G is quantum-safe, its one-wayness is also quantum-safe
and thus both properties of F are also quantum-safe.
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D Proof of Theorem 6.9
In the following, we will denote by f(s, e, c), the function REG2.EvalP(k, (s, e, c)) for k the index
function obtained by REG2.GenP(1n), and by s0, e0 the trapdoor information associated with this
function f .
We now prove separately the δ-2 regularity, collision resistance, one-wayness and trapdoor
property of the function in Definition 6.2.
D.1 δ-2 regularity
Here we describe how to achieve δ-2 regularity using the construction FromInj and specifically, the
function in Definition 6.2.
This reduces to ensuring that the two function inputs (s, e) and (s− s0, e− e0) both lie within
the domain of the function. The input (s, e) is the result of the inversion algorithm, so it is by
definition inside the domain. Additionally, as the first element of the domain is only required to be
in Znq and as Zq is closed with subtraction mod q, then s − s0 ∈ Znq for any s, s0 ∈ Znq . On the
other hand, the second element of the domain is required to be in Zm, such that each component
is bounded in absolute value by some value µ. In this case, we are not guaranteed that adding or
subtracting two such elements the result is still in the domain. What we want to ensure is that
with (at least) constant probability over the choice of (s, e) and (s0, e0), the result (s− s0, e− e0)
is in the domain of the function.
It is not difficult to show that if (s0, e0) is chosen arbitrarily from the domain of the function,
then (s − s0, e − e0) lies within the domain of the function only with inverse exponential in m
probability. This is why we consider restricting e0 to be within a subset of the domain. By suitable
choice of this subset we can make the success probability (of having two preimages) – seen as a
function in m – to be at least a constant value.
Firstly, we remark that the exact probability of success can be explicitly computed. Indeed, if
the trapdoor noise e0 is sampled from a Gaussian of dimension m, and standard deviation σ, and
if the noise e1 is sampled uniformly from an hypercube C of length 2µ (both distribution being
centered on 0) then the probability that e0 + e1 is still inside C is:(
erf
(√
2µ
σ
)
− σ√
2piµ
(
1− exp
(
−2
(µ
σ
)2)))m
However, for simplicity, and because we do not aim to find optimal parameters, we will use a
(simpler) lower bound of this probability (that will be less efficient by a factor of
√
m). To do that,
remark that using Lemma 2.5 in [Reg05], we have that if e0 ∈ Zm, such that each component of e0
is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with parameter α′q, then we have that every component
of the vector e0 is less than µ
′ := α′q
√
m with overwhelming probability when m increases. So one
can remark that, up to a negligible term, the Gaussian distribution with parameter α′q is “closer
to 0” than the uniform distribution on [−α′q√m;α′q√m] for sufficiently large m (i.e. for any x,
the integral between −x and x of the Gaussian distribution is bigger, up to a negligible term, than
the integral of the uniform distribution). Therefore, to obtain a lower bound on the probability of
having two preimages, we can consider that e0 is sampled according to the uniform distribution on
a hypercube of length 2α′q
√
m rather than according to the Gaussian distribution of parameter α′q.
This simplifies our analysis, and allows us to find the subset in which e0 must reside, as seen in the
following lemma. Note also that if you do not want to do any assumption on the input distribution,
and only assume that the infinity norm is smaller than µ′, then the same Lemma applies with the
constant 4 replaced by 2.
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Lemma D.1 (Domain Addition). Let V = Rm be a vector space of dimension m, and let Dm,µ be
the uniform distribution inside the hypercube of dimention m and length 2µ centered on 0. Then,
for any µ′ < µ, we have:
Pm,µ,µ′ := Pr
[||e0 + e1||∞ ≤ µ | e0 ← Dm,µ′ , e1 ← Dm,µ] = (1− µ′
4µ
)m
Moreover, if µ′ = O( µm) then the probability Pm,µ,µ′ becomes lower bounded by a positive constant.
Proof. As ||e0+e1||∞ must be less than µ, which means that each component of the sum vector must
be less than µ, and as each component of the 2 vectors e0 and e1 was independently sampled, then
we can simplify our proof by considering that e0 and e1 are vectors in R, essentially determining
P1,µ,µ′ and then, we can compute Pm,µ,µ′ = P1,µ,µ′
m.
Then, let us denote by E1 the random variable sampled uniformly from [−µ, µ], E0 the random
variable sampled uniformly from [−µ′, µ′] and E the random variable obtained as E = E1 + E0.
Therefore, P1,µ,µ′ = Pr[−µ ≤ E ≤ µ].
Now, we can compute the density function of E using convolution:
fE(e) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fE1(e1) · fE0(e− e1) de1
where fE1 and fE0 are the probability density functions of E1 and E0 (fE1(e1) =
1
2µ , when e1 ∈
[−µ, µ] and 0 elsewhere and fE0(e0) = 12µ′ , when e0 ∈ [−µ′, µ′] and 0 elsewhere).
Then, we are only interested in the cases when both the values of fE1(e1) and fE0(e − e1) are
non-zero and for this we need to consider 3 cases for e, given by the intervals: e ∈ [−µ − µ′, µ′ −
µ]
⋃
[µ′ − µ, µ− µ′] ⋃ [µ− µ′, µ+ µ′]. Thus, we can derive:
fE(e) =

∫ e+µ′
−µ
1
4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [−µ− µ′, µ′ − µ]∫ e+µ′
e−µ′
1
4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [µ′ − µ, µ− µ′]∫ µ
e−µ′
1
4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [µ− µ′, µ+ µ′]
Finally, we have that Pr[−µ ≤ E ≤ µ] = ∫ µ−µ fE(e) de = ∫ −µ+µ′−µ fE(e) de + ∫ µ−µ′−µ+µ′ fE(e) de +∫ µ
µ−µ′ fE(e) de =
∫ −µ+µ′
−µ
e+µ′+µ
4µµ′ de+
∫ µ−µ′
−µ+µ′
1
2µ de+
∫ µ
µ−µ′
µ+µ′−e
4µµ′ de = 1− µ
′
4µ .
Consequently, we have Pm,µ,µ′ = (1− µ
′
4µ)
m.
Now, given that µ is a function of m, µ = µ(m), we want to determine the values of µ′, such
that this probability (seen as a function in m) is at least a positive constant number.
• If lim
m→∞
µ′
µ
= 0, then:
lim
m→∞
(
1− µ
′
4µ
)m
= lim
m→∞
(
1− µ
′
4µ
) 4µ
µ′
µ′m
4µ
=
(
1
e
)limm→∞ µ′m4µ
Now, what we require is that lim
m→∞
µ′m
4µ
= c ≥ 0, where c is a constant, as then, we have that
the probability of success is at least a constant ≥ (1e)c.
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• If lim
m→∞
µ′
µ
> 0 (and less than 1, as 0 < µ′ < µ), then:
lim
m→∞
(
1− µ
′
4µ
)m
= 0
Consequently, it is clear that in order to get a positive constant lower bound for the success
probability, we must have:
µ′ = c · 4µ
m
, c ≥ 0
Thus, in our case, if e1 is sampled uniformly on a hypercube of length 2µ and e0 from a Gaussian
with parameter α′q, by replacing the actual values of µ = αq
√
m and µ′ := α′q
√
m, what we require
is that:
α′ = c · 4α
m
, c ≥ 0
D.2 Collision resistance
We start by the observation that for the choices of Definition 6.2, no PPT adversary can infer the
trapdoor information (s0, e0), as determining s0 from k = (A, b0) would be equivalent to solving
LWEq,Ψ¯α′q :
Corollary D.2 (One-wayness of the trapdoor [Reg05, Theorem 1.1] ). Under the SIVPγ (with
γ = poly(n)) assumption, no PPT adversary can recover the trapdoor information (s0, e0).
Lemma D.3 (Collision resistance). The function f defined in Definition 6.2 is collision resistant
if the parameters are chosen accordingly to Theorem 6.9 assuming that SIVPγ is hard.
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose that this function is not collision resistant. Then there
exist two pairs (s1, e1), (s2, e2) such that f(s1, e1, 0) = y = f(s2, e2, 1). Note that the last bits
are necessary different since the two functions that fix the last bit, are injective when the error
is smaller than rmax (according to [MP12, Theorem 5.4]). By the definition of f , ||e1||∞ ≤ µ
and ||e2||∞ ≤ µ, i.e both e1 and e2 has Euclidean norm smaller than
√
mµ. Then, by definition,
y = f(s2, e2, 1) = f(s2, e2, 0) + f(s0, e0, 0) = A(s2 + s0) + (e2 + e0). Now, we remark that with
overwhelming probability (over the choice of the trapdoor), ||e0||2 ≤ µ′
√
m as stated in [Reg05,
Lemma 2.5], so in this case, ||e2 + e0||2 ≤
√
m(µ + µ′) ≤ rmax (last assumption of Theorem 6.9).
Then, according to [MP12, Theorem 5.4], there is exactly one element (s, e) with e of length smaller
than rmax such that As + e = y. Because (s1, e1) is a solution, we then have that: s2 + s0 = s1
and e2 + e0 = e1, i.e. e0 = e1 − e2 and s0 = s1 − s2. Hence, it is possible to deduce the trapdoor
information s0 and e0 from the collision pair, which is impossible by Theorem D.2.
D.3 One-wayness
One could imagine that the one-wayness of the resulting function of Definition 6.2 is implied by
the one-wayness of the function in [MP12] (as is the case in Theorem 6.4). However, we need more
care here, since in our construction the error term e is not sampled from a Gaussian distribution
with suitable parameters (unlike the error term e0).
16
16 While other ways to prove the one-wayness are possible, we give here one proof that uses the previous two
lemmata.
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Lemma D.4 (Collision resistance to one-wayness). Let f : A → B ∪ ⊥ (with ⊥ /∈ B), where A
is finite and can be efficiently sampled uniformly and let C be the set of all y ∈ B that admit 2
preimages. If the restriction of f to the set f−1(B) is a collision resistant function that admits with
non-negligible probability two preimages for any y from its image and if |f
−1(C)|
|A| is non-negligible,
then f restricted to the set f−1(C) is a one-way function.
Proof. By contradiction: suppose that f is not one-way on C, i.e. with a non-negligible probability
we can find a preimage of y for y uniformly sampled in C, and from this we can show how to find a
collision. The idea is to sample an input x ∈ A, and then compute y := f(x). Then, as |f−1(C)||A| is
non-negligible, we know that with non-negligible probability this y will have two preimages. Now,
with non-negligible probability, this function will be easy to invert and one gets x′. Because we
sample uniformly at the step before, we have the same probability to sample one image or the
other, so with probability 1/2, x′ 6= x, therefore, we found a collision.
Corollary D.5 (One-wayness from Theorem D.3 and Theorem D.4 ). The function defined in
Definition 6.2 is one-way for all y that admit two preimages, under the SIVPγ hardness assumption,
when the parameters are chosen accordingly to Theorem 6.9.
D.4 Trapdoor
We want to prove that using the trapdoor information of the REG2 construction, which consists of
(s0, e0) and tk, the trapdoor information of the LWE function, we can efficiently derive the preimages
of an output b of REG2.Eval. Firstly, we notice that to find all the preimages, we can simply run
LWE.Inv on b as well as on b− b0 and if we succeed we take only the preimages that lie in the input
domain, i.e. whose error part e is bounded in infinity norm by µ: ||e||∞ ≤ µ. Because the function
is injective, these are all the possible preimages. However, because we are interested only in the case
when there are exactly two preimages, the function REG2.Inv can also do the following: we first
run LWE.Inv on b and obtain (s1, e1). Then, the inversion is completed by returning (s1, e1, 0) and
(s1 − s0, e1 − e0, 1), which are both valid preimages, if and only if the function has two preimages
(see Theorem D.3 for more details).
E Proof of Theorem 6.10
Proof. Using the following explicit values for the parameters of the Micciancio and Peikert injective
trapdoor function [MP12], we want to prove that they fulfil all of the requirements of Theorem 6.9:
n = λ
k = 5 dlog(n)e+ 21
q = 2k
m¯ = 2n
ω = nk
m = m¯+ ω
µ =
⌈
2mn
√
2 + k
⌉
µ′ = µ/m
B = 2
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and α, α′, C are defined as in Theorem 6.9. Now, let us proof that these parameters satisfy all the
requirements.
• The first three requirements are trivially satisfied.
• In the forth condition, the only difficulty is to show that α < 1. By definition,
α =
mµ√
mmq
=
µ√
mq
=
⌈
2mn
√
2 + k
⌉
√
mq
≤ 4mn
√
2 + k√
mq
≤ 8mn
√
k√
mq
≤ 8
√
mnk
q
≤ 8
√
2n+ nknk
221n5
≤ 8
√
2nknk
221n5
≤ 16(nk)
3/2
221n5
≤ 16(n(5(log(n) + 1) + 21))
3/2
221n5
≤ 16(5× 21n
2)3/2
221n5
≤ 16× 1076n
3
221n5
<
1
n2
≤ 1
• Now, let us show the fifth condition, i.e. α′q ≥ 2√n. First we note that α′q := µ√
mm
≥
2
√
n⇔ µ ≥ 2√nm√m = 2mn√2 + k. Then, by defining µ = ⌈2mn√2 + k⌉, the condition is
satisfied.
• For the fifth condition, i.e. nα′ is poly(n), we just need to remark that 1/α′ = m
3/2q
µ < m
3/2q,
and that both m and q are poly(n).
• Finally, to show that the last condition is satisfied, we note that:
√
mµ <
q
2B
√(
C · (α · q) · (√2n+√kn+√n)
)2
+ 1
− µ′√m (46)
=
q
4
√(
C · µ√
m
· (√2n+√kn+√n)
)2
+ 1
− µ√
m
(47)
if and only if
A := 4
(√
m+
1√
m
)
µ
√(
C · µ√
m
· (
√
2n+
√
kn+
√
n)
)2
+ 1 ≤ q
Now, let us suppose that k := u dlog(n)e+ v with u ≤ 5 and v ≥ 19 and we need to find u, v
such that A ≤ 2k. Note that we will include v in some constants and then find the good v at
the end. First, remark that:
√
m+
1√
m
=
√
m(1 +
1
m
) (48)
=
√
m(1 +
1
n(2 + k)
) (49)
≤ √m(1 + 1
2 + k
) (50)
≤ √m (1 + 1
2 + v
)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
γ0
= γ0
√
m (51)
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So now,
A ≤ 4Cγ0µ2
√
kn
√√√√√
(
1 +
√
2
k
+
1√
k
)2
+
1
kn
(
C · µ√
m
)2
= 4Cγ0
⌈
2mn
√
2 + k
⌉2√
kn
√√√√√√
(
1 +
√
2
k
+
1√
k
)2
+
1
kn
(
C · d2mn
√
2+ke√
m
)2
≤ 4Cγ0
⌈
2mn
√
2 + k
⌉2√
kn
√√√√(1 +√2
v
+
1√
v
)2
+
1
v
(
2C
√
2 + v
)2´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
γ1
≤ 4Cγ0γ1
(
2mn
√
2 + k + 1
)2√
kn
= 4Cγ0γ1
(
2n2(2 + k)3/2 + 1
)2√
kn
= 16Cγ0γ1n
4(2 + k)3
(
1 +
1
2n2(2 + k)3/2
)2√
kn
≤ 16Cγ0γ1n4(2 + k)3
(
1 +
1
2(2 + v)3/2
)2
´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
γ2
√
kn
≤ 16Cγ0γ1γ2n4
(
k
(
1 +
2
k
))3√
kn
≤ 16Cγ0γ1γ2n4k3
(
1 +
2
v
)3
´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
γ3
√
kn
≤ 16Cγ0γ1γ2γ3n9/2 (u dlog(n)e+ v)7/2
= 16Cγ0γ1γ2γ3n
9/2v7/2
(
1 +
u dlog(n)e
v
)7/2
≤ 16Cγ0γ1γ2γ3n9/2v7/2
(
1 +
5 dlog(n)e
19
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≤ 16Cγ0γ1γ2γ3n9/2v7/23n1/2
≤ 48Cγ0γ1γ2γ3v7/2n5
Finally, we observe that if v = 21 and u = 5, we have A ≤ 2v+udlog(n)e = 2k, which concludes
the proof.
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